No abstract

Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach the history of psychology methodologically. The aim of this article is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology by proposing an alternative but complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. I will then introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its possible advantages and limitations. Keywordshistory of psychology, history of science, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of science Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. 1 How might we conceive a critical history of psychology and bury once and for all the so-called celebratory or naïve historical narratives that still exist in the field? The recent debate between Kurt Danziger (2013) and Daniel Robinson (2013aRobinson ( , 2013b shows clearly that there are still profound disagreements among historians of psychology about

In recent decades, various studies have challenged the traditional view that John Broadus Watson's Behaviorist Manifesto prompted a psychological revolution. However, methodological hindrances underlie all these attempts to evaluate the impact of Watson's study, such as the absence of comparative parameters. This article remedies this problem by conducting a comparative citation analysis involving Watson and eight other representative psychologists of the time:

Despite the numerous and important contributions brought by Wundt scholarship in recent decades, some aspects of his work remain unclear and poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to explore one of these aspects, namely, the relationship between philosophy and psychology in Wundt's thought. To this end, we shall discuss an important yet neglected moment in Wundtian psychology, which remains unexplained to date: Why did Wundt abandon his early theory of the unconscious? According to the interpretation offered here, this can only be adequately explained by his intense philosophical studies in the period preceding the publication of the Grundzüge in 1874. Finally, we will point out some implications of this analysis to the general interpretation of Wundt's psychological project.

No abstract