Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology

On making sense. An exploration of Wundt’s apperceptionist account of meaningful speech

“…To avoid unnecessary confusion, we will focus exclusively on Wundt’s later work, in which he put forward his mature theory of consciousness. Following Araujo’s () excellent discussion of the most important evolutions in Wundt’s psychological theory, everything written after 1874 will be considered as representative for Wundt’s mature position. To be sure, that is not to say that Wundt’s work was not subject to revisions after that date, but rather that these revisions indicate a further articulation and consolidation of his psychological program, rather than fundamental changes in his philosophical and psychological outlook (Araujo, , p. 125).…”

“…Following Araujo’s () excellent discussion of the most important evolutions in Wundt’s psychological theory, everything written after 1874 will be considered as representative for Wundt’s mature position. To be sure, that is not to say that Wundt’s work was not subject to revisions after that date, but rather that these revisions indicate a further articulation and consolidation of his psychological program, rather than fundamental changes in his philosophical and psychological outlook (Araujo, , p. 125). Within the scope of our investigation, the most significant shift in Wundt’s mature position pertained to his rejection of unconscious mental processes, as it paved the way for a renewed conceptualization of the nature and systematic place of the process of apperception.…”

“…Within the scope of our investigation, the most significant shift in Wundt’s mature position pertained to his rejection of unconscious mental processes, as it paved the way for a renewed conceptualization of the nature and systematic place of the process of apperception. Indeed, Wundt’s mature theory of apperception included synthetic processes within the conscious sphere, thus making the hypothesis of unconscious ideation redundant (Araujo, , ). Although a full discussion of the motives and nature of this crucial shift in Wundt’s position falls outside the scope of this paper, it explains our focus on Wundt’s later work in what follows.…”

“…On the other hand, the doctrine introduced a form of teleological explanation within his psychological system, and a correlative terminological assimilation of the psychological “motive” to the notion of a purposive or intended cause [Zweckursache], as it allows a regressive explanation of internal and external voluntary action in terms of an inherent purposiveness . By virtue of the motive, Wundt specified, “the effect is anticipated as the purpose to be reached, after which the conditions that appear as the means to bring about this purpose are sought” (Wundt, , as quoted in Araujo, , p. 152). The unity of consciousness and the consciousness of unity . Finally, Wundt referred to the apperceptive function as the uniting function of consciousness [Einheitsfunction des Bewusstseins], that is, as that which imparts unity to the manifold of conscious experiences (Wundt, , II, p. 573).…”

Back to the Origins of the Repudiation of Wundt: Oswald Külpe and Richard Avenarius

“…Among many, we may mention Kusch (, ), MacNamara (), Tolman (), Woodward and Ash (), and Mischel (). The only studies with some more references to Avenarius are Robinson (), Arens () Mülberger (), and Araujo (). However, all these works miss the focus of Avenarius’ conception of psychology: that is, the shift from a first‐person to a third‐person point of view (see paragraph 5).…”