Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach the history of psychology methodologically. The aim of this article is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology by proposing an alternative but complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. I will then introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its possible advantages and limitations.
Keywordshistory of psychology, history of science, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of science Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. 1 How might we conceive a critical history of psychology and bury once and for all the so-called celebratory or naïve historical narratives that still exist in the field? The recent debate between Kurt Danziger (2013) and Daniel Robinson (2013aRobinson ( , 2013b shows clearly that there are still profound disagreements among historians of psychology about