The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to correlate with measures of utilitarian moral judgment because it measures system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. And some theories of moral judgment hold that the same thing often happens when people arrive a utilitarian judgments. We find, however, that CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious intuitive answers at predicting utilitarian moral judgment, assessed with self-report questionnaires as well as with hypothetical scenarios, and also at predicting a measure of actively openminded thinking (AOT). Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, also predict moral judgment and other outcomes. The CRT might thus be considered a test of reflection-impulsivity (RI). However, RI is only part of AOT, because RI is concerned only with the amount of thinking, not its direction. Tests of AOT also predict utilitarian moral judgments. Individual differences in AOT and moral judgments are both strongly (negatively) associated with belief that morality comes from God and cannot be understood through thought. The correlation of CRT and utilitarian judgment, when found, is thus likely due to the (imperfect) correlation of AOT and CRT. Intuition in these domains is thus not necessarily something that people overcome through additional thinking, but rather what they rely on when they do not think very much.

This article extends psychological methods and concepts into a domain that is as profoundly consequential as it is poorly understood: intelligence analysis. We report findings from a geopolitical forecasting tournament that assessed the accuracy of more than 150,000 forecasts of 743 participants on 199 events occurring over 2 years. Participants were above average in intelligence and political knowledge relative to the general population. Individual differences in performance emerged, and forecasting skills were surprisingly consistent over time. Key predictors were (a) dispositional variables of cognitive ability, political knowledge, and openmindedness; (b) situational variables of training in probabilistic reasoning and participation in collaborative teams that shared information and discussed rationales (Mellers, Ungar, et al., 2014); and (c) behavioral variables of deliberation time and frequency of belief updating. We developed a profile of the best forecasters; they were better at inductive reasoning, pattern detection, cognitive flexibility, and open-mindedness. They had greater understanding of geopolitics, training in probabilistic reasoning, and opportunities to succeed in cognitively enriched team environments. Last but not least, they viewed forecasting as a skill that required deliberate practice, sustained effort, and constant monitoring of current affairs. A t APA, we understand how challenging it can be for you to stay abreast of the latest and best academic research on psychology. Disciplines Finance and Financial Management | Social and Behavioral Sciences

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and Houck (2014) report a major effort to automate integrative complexity coding. Judging this effort requires researchers to be more explicit in articulating key methodological assumptions about the coding process and theoretical assumptions about the construct. Unresolved issues include: (1) when, and on what basis, we should attribute divergences between human coders and algorithms to overestimations or underestimations by one or the other approach; and (2) to what extent second-generation algorithms can yield Pareto improvements that reduce errors of both underestimation and overestimation. Further progress in developing natural language processing measures of this cognitive style will require sharper definitions of target constructs: in particular, different types of differentiation (dialectical and elaborative) and integration (hierarchical and flexible) and clearer guidelines for factoring context into assessments.

Why is evolutionary theory controversial among members of the American public? We propose a novel explanation: allegiance to different criteria for belief. In one interview study, two online surveys, and one nationally representative phone poll, we found that evolutionists and creationists take different justifications for belief as legitimate. Those who accept evolution emphasize empirical evidence and scientific consensus. Creationists emphasize not only the Bible and religious authority, but also knowledge of the heart. These criteria for belief remain predictive of views about evolution even when taking into account other related factors like religion, political affiliation, and education. Each view is supported by its own internally specified criteria for what constitutes a justified belief. Changing minds may thus require changing epistemic norms.

In a mixed-methods study following 1551 adolescents from eight diverse schools across the US, a large majority demonstrated (a) strong norms of actively open-minded thinking (AOT) and (b) a widespread capacity for AOT. Students from two public (government) schools, two private (public) schools, and two charter (academy) schools were followed for 18 months over the transition from middle school to high school, with data collected in each semester of the eighth grade and ninth grade year. The study included an unusually varied set of approaches to assess AOT values and habits, including a rating scale, two new multiple choice measures, teacher reports from three teachers per student, peer nomination, and interviews with subsets of the larger sample. These varied measures converged to reveal widespread openness to disagreement, desire for understanding, and pluralistic norms. In interviews, participants demonstrated AOT in three powerful ways: deep search for ideas, epistemic empathy, and pluralistic thinking. Moreover, repeated administration of measures indicated moderate intertemporal reliability of this trait, with six-month test-retest correlations ranging from .27 to .59 depending on the measure. This research suggests that existing capacities for AOT could be more fruitfully leveraged and supported by educators, helping students to capitalise on their own values and intuitions as they develop into mature critical thinkers. [Corrections made on 24 August 2020 after first online publication: 'web search' was incorrectly used throughout this article and it has now been corrected to 'search' in this version] Keywords adolescence, cognitive development, critical thinking. Ever since Dewey (1916), there has been a growing push to teach students not just what to think, but how to think. Eighty percent of Americans think schools should teach critical thinking (Gallup, 2013). Critical thinking is front and centre in the Common Core Standards, a set of curricular goalposts rolled out in 2009 and now adopted by 42 states (Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2016). But if we as a society want to teach our children to be good thinkers, we had better have some idea how a good thinker thinks. Baron (1988, 1993) suggested that the best critical thinking is actively open-minded; that is, characterised by a deep and unbiased search for alternatives, evidence, reasons, and goals. Long reflection is not sufficient for good thinking if it is merely an elaboration of support for a favoured conclusion (Wason and Evans, 1975); a balanced consideration of alternatives is also necessary.

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