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Science curricula at the elementary school level frequently emphasize the "concrete, " with a focus on the processes of observation, ordering, and categorization of the directly perceivable. Within this approach, abstract ideas and the planning of investigations and analysis of their results are in large part postponed until higher grades. This practice stems from purported developmental constraints on children s thinking. This article analyzes these constraints in light of the writings of Piaget, to whom they are frequently attributed, and contemporary developmental theory and research. Neither the Piagetian nor the non-Piagetian research supports the validity of these developmental assumptions. The article also identifies several intrinsic problematic aspects of this approach to children's science, including the failure to appreciate the challenge of adequate scientific description, the liabilities of decontextualization, and the epistemological messages it conveys to children. Both Piagetian and non-Piagetian literatures support the feasibility of children's science curricula in which the processes previously approached as ends become tools in contextualized and authentic scientific inquiry.

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In contrast to predictions or actions, explanations require articulating a model that accounts for the physical phenomenon.

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My earlier article (Metz, 1995 ) identified several assumptions about elementary school children’s scientific reasoning abilities that have frequently been used for the purpose of framing “developmental appropriate” science curricula. That article traced the origin of those assumptions to an interpretation of a segment of Piaget’s writings and then critiqued those assumptions of the basis of Piaget’s corpus, as well as the contemporary cognitive developmental research literature. Given that developmental research constituted the primary base on which I critiqued these assumptions and formulated alternative recommendations, lam surprised by Deanna Kuhn’s ( 1997 ) contention that the article could be read as suggesting that the developmental literature has “failed” science educators and that they would be advised to look elsewhere to inform their curricular design. Nevertheless, I do consider the relation between cognitive developmental research, as embodied in the contemporary research tradition, and children’s science curricula as fundamentally complex. This essay examines three interrelated characteristics of the cognitive developmental research tradition that contribute to the complexity of this relationship: (a) its tendency to attribute shortcomings in performance to the child’s stage, with the assumption that these shortcomings will disappear with sufficient advancement of cognitive development; (b) the frequent confounding of weak knowledge with developmentally based cognitive deficiencies; and (c) the emphasis of robust stage-based constraints on children’s thinking, to the neglect of variability and change.

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