The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to correlate with measures of utilitarian moral judgment because it measures system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. And some theories of moral judgment hold that the same thing often happens when people arrive a utilitarian judgments. We find, however, that CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious intuitive answers at predicting utilitarian moral judgment, assessed with self-report questionnaires as well as with hypothetical scenarios, and also at predicting a measure of actively openminded thinking (AOT). Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, also predict moral judgment and other outcomes. The CRT might thus be considered a test of reflection-impulsivity (RI). However, RI is only part of AOT, because RI is concerned only with the amount of thinking, not its direction. Tests of AOT also predict utilitarian moral judgments. Individual differences in AOT and moral judgments are both strongly (negatively) associated with belief that morality comes from God and cannot be understood through thought. The correlation of CRT and utilitarian judgment, when found, is thus likely due to the (imperfect) correlation of AOT and CRT. Intuition in these domains is thus not necessarily something that people overcome through additional thinking, but rather what they rely on when they do not think very much.

Five university-based research groups competed to recruit forecasters, elicit their predictions, and aggregate those predictions to assign the most accurate probabilities to events in a 2-year geopolitical forecasting tournament. Our group tested and found support for three psychological drivers of accuracy: training, teaming, and tracking. Probability training corrected cognitive biases, encouraged forecasters to use reference classes, and provided forecasters with heuristics, such as averaging when multiple estimates were available. Teaming allowed forecasters to share information and discuss the rationales behind their beliefs. Tracking placed the highest performers (top 2% from Year 1) in elite teams that worked together. Results showed that probability training, team collaboration, and tracking improved both calibration and resolution. Forecasting is often viewed as a statistical problem, but forecasts can be improved with behavioral interventions. Training, teaming, and tracking are psychological interventions that dramatically increased the accuracy of forecasts. Statistical algorithms (reported elsewhere) improved the accuracy of the aggregation. Putting both statistics and psychology to work produced the best forecasts 2 years in a row.

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This article uses methods drawn from perceptual psychology to answer a basic social psychological question: Do people process the faces of norm violators differently from those of others--and, if so, what is the functional significance? Seven studies suggest that people process these faces different and the differential processing makes it easier to punish norm violators. Studies 1 and 2 use a recognition-recall paradigm that manipulated facial-inversion and spatial frequency to show that people rely upon face-typical processing less when they perceive norm violators' faces. Study 3 uses a facial composite task to demonstrate that the effect is actor dependent, not action dependent, and to suggest that configural processing is the mechanism of perceptual change. Studies 4 and 5 use offset faces to show that configural processing is only attenuated when they belong to perpetrators who are culpable. Studies 6 and 7 show that people find it easier to punish inverted faces and harder to punish faces displayed in low spatial frequency. Taken together, these data suggest a bidirectional flow of causality between lower-order perceptual and higher-order cognitive processes in norm enforcement.

This article links the visual perception of faces and social behavior. We argue that the ways in which people visually encode others’ faces—a rapid-fire perceptual categorization—can result in either humanizing or dehumanizing modes of perception. Our model suggests that these perceptual pathways channel subsequent social inferences and behavior. We focus on the construct of perceptual dehumanization, which involves a shift from configural to featural processing of human faces and, in turn, enables the infliction of harm, such as harsh punishments. We discuss visual attention as an antecedent of perceptual modes and consequent modes of social behavior and speculate about the functions of humanization and dehumanization in sustaining macro-level social structures.

We provide systematic evidence for the range and importance of hedonic reversals as a major source of pleasure, and incorporate these findings into the theory of benign masochism. Twenty-nine different initially aversive activities are shown to produce pleasure (hedonic reversals) in substantial numbers of individuals from both college student and Mechanical Turk samples. Hedonic reversals group, by factor analysis, into sadness, oral irritation, fear, physical activity/exhaustion, pain, strong alcohol-related tastes, bitter tastes, and disgust. Liking for sad experiences (music, novels, movies, paintings) forms a coherent entity, and is related to enjoyment of crying in response to sad movies. For fear and oral irritation, individuals also enjoy the body’s defensive reactions. Enjoyment of sadness is higher in females across domains. We explain these findings in terms of benign masochism, enjoyment of negative bodily reactions and feelings in the context of feeling safe, or pleasure at “mind over body”. In accordance with benign masochism, for many people, the favored level of initially negative experiences is just below the level that cannot be tolerated.

We investigated the role of metacognition in the process by which people learn new cultural norms from experiential feedback. In a lab paradigm, participants received many trials of simulated interpersonal situations in a new culture, each of which required them to make a choice, and then provided them with evaluative feedback about the accuracy of their choice with regard to local norms. Studies 1 to 3 found that participants higher on an individual difference dimension of metacognitive proclivity learned to adhere to the local norms faster. This relationship held up in simple and complex situations, that is, when the feedback was noisy rather than completely reliable, and it also held up when possibly confounding individual differences were controlled (Study 2). Further evidence suggested that the underlying mechanism is the largely implicit process of error monitoring and reactive error-based updating. A measure of surprise (an indicator of error monitoring) mediated the link between metacognitive proclivity and faster learning (Study 3). In experiments that varied the task so as to afford different kinds of metacognitive processing, participants learned faster with post-error prompts but not with post-accuracy prompts (Study 4). Further, they learned faster with non-directed prompts that merely provided a break for processing rather with prompts that directly instructed them to reason explicitly (Study 5). We discuss the implications of these findings for models of culture, first-and secondculture learning, and for training and selecting people for foreign or intercultural roles.

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