No abstract

Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados. AbstractThis article uses the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method to examine the combinations of conditions that explain the length of World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes that invoke General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs' (GATT) General Exceptions (Article XX). Using the Brazil-EC controversy over retreaded tires as an example, the work underscores the importance of the mobilization of civil society organizations such as NGOs and think tanks in association with power asymmetry and/or veto players. The article contributes to understanding the causal complexity and empirical heterogeneity of "exceptional" disputes (disputes in which a party invokes GATT's General Exceptions). Article Compliance in "exceptional" trade disputes: a set-theoretical approach Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 63(1): e003, 2020 Cezar 2 Compliance in "exceptional" trade disputes: a set-theoretical approach Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 63(1): e003, 2020 Cezar 4 Compliance in "exceptional" trade disputes: a set-theoretical approach Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 63(1): e003, 2020 Cezar 9

This article proposes a framework centered on coalitions between the executive, the congress and interest groups for the analysis of the US trade policymaking process. Such a framework is focused on two main concepts, "willingness to bargain" and "pivotal actor". The work advances two main hypotheses related to the ability of pro-free-trade actors to come to an agreement and anti-free-trade actors to effectively oppose trade liberalization. Two case studies are undertaken in order to check the plausibility of such hypotheses: the fast-track fiasco (1997) and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China (2000).

Recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) granted Mexico the right to retaliate against the US as a compensation for losses related to the US ‘dolphin-safe’ label (May 2017). Despite the diversity of works on the issue, few analyze the changes in the US approach to dolphin protection as a result of international and domestic pressures related to the tuna–dolphin controversy. This paper seeks to understand such changes and their consequences using the process tracing method. It shows that (1) the US approach to dolphin protection passed through a process of policy change motivated by trade and diplomatic concerns mediating dolphin protection, and that (2) it was partially reversed in court as an outcome of the concessions offered to get the policy change approved. Finally, the paper argues that (3) this process led to the lock-in of the US ‘dolphin-safe’ label and to its expansion in response to recent WTO decisions.

Some protrade business interests that are against hard enforcement of labor and environmental provisions in trade deals may end up eventually supporting it, while others stick to their initial opposition. Why? When will their positions change? The existing literature would expect protrade interests to be more or less in favor of non-trade issues in trade policies according to how dependent on the international economy they are. However, longitudinal variation in export- and import-dependence does not suffice to explain change of the sort I am interested in. I argue that the position of protrade business interests change as they accumulate experiences on the negotiation/ratification of trade deals. To probe that argument, I present two paired comparisons analyzing the position of protrade business interests as pertains to the use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by Canada and Australia, and by the United States (US) and European Union (EU) between 1993 and 2019. My analysis points to the overall plausibility of my hypothesis and to avenues for future research. The paper helps understand the political activity of business interests on trade and sustainable development and can shed new light on the politics behind the design of social and environmental provisions in PTAs.

Recent works have pointed out that global value chain (GVC) integration affects the trade preferences of firms, that large GVC-integrated firms are highly politically active and that they can influence the design of institutions of trade governance (

Who decides about the promotion of social objectives in EU’s trade policies? The existing literature oscillates between giving emphasis to the EU Commission or to interest group lobbying. Both approaches have limitations. To overcome those limitations, I here revisit the EU history of promoting labour provisions at the bi – and multilateral trade levels between 1993 and 2016. I argue that the EU Commission acts in line with the political positions and preferences of EU constituents on trade-labour linkage and that its autonomy depends on how polarized and salient those positions are. After finding evidence in line with that argument, I conclude that EU principals are ultimately in control of the link between trade and social objectives in EU trade policy and that the autonomy of the Commission, although existent, is limited. This article applies nuance to arguments centred on the power of the Commission to promote its own preferences at the expense of its constituents’. In doing so, it also contributes to understanding the politics of the design of social and sustainable development provisions in EU trade agreements. Trade Agreements. Labour. Social Issues. Principal-Agent Relations. Historical Narratives. European Union. EU Commission. Autonomy. Decision-making. Sanctions

No abstract