A coalition approach to trade policymaking in the United States: the fast-track authority fiasco of 1997 and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China in 2000

Abstract

This article proposes a framework centered on coalitions between the executive, the congress and interest groups for the analysis of the US trade policymaking process. Such a framework is focused on two main concepts, "willingness to bargain" and "pivotal actor". The work advances two main hypotheses related to the ability of pro-free-trade actors to come to an agreement and anti-free-trade actors to effectively oppose trade liberalization. Two case studies are undertaken in order to check the plausibility of such hypotheses: the fast-track fiasco (1997) and the approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China (2000).

“Queremos un lugar en la mesa”. Los sindicatos estadounidenses contra la globalización: de la “Batalla de Seattle” al ingreso de China a la OMC

“…La polarización de la discusión sobre este mecanismo remite a su asociación con el NAFTA. Los opositores a este acuerdo veían la renovación del fast-track como un referéndum del acuerdo, por eso en 1997 nuevamente sufrió un rechazo tras un fuerte lobby de la AFL-CIO y grupos ecologistas (Cezar y Carvalho, 2017;Shoch, 2001).…”