52% Yes, a signiicant crisis 3% No, there is no crisis 7% Don't know 38% Yes, a slight crisis 38% Yes, a slight crisis 1,576 RESEARCHERS SURVEYED M ore than 70% of researchers have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist's experiments, and more than half have failed to reproduce their own experiments. Those are some of the telling figures that emerged from Nature's survey of 1,576 researchers who took a brief online questionnaire on reproducibility in research. The data reveal sometimes-contradictory attitudes towards reproduc-ibility. Although 52% of those surveyed agree that there is a significant 'crisis' of reproducibility, less than 31% think that failure to reproduce published results means that the result is probably wrong, and most say that they still trust the published literature. Data on how much of the scientific literature is reproducible are rare and generally bleak. The best-known analyses, from psychology 1 and cancer biology 2 , found rates of around 40% and 10%, respectively. Our survey respondents were more optimistic: 73% said that they think that at least half of the papers in their field can be trusted, with physicists and chemists generally showing the most confidence. The results capture a confusing snapshot of attitudes around these issues, says Arturo Casadevall, a microbiologist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland. "At the current time there is no consensus on what reproducibility is or should be. " But just recognizing that is a step forward, he says. "The next step may be identifying what is the problem and to get a consensus. "

Characterization of the global network topology and the position of individual nodes in that topology. Psychometric network analysisThe analysis of multivariate psychometric data using network structure estimation and network description.

Network approaches to psychometric constructs, in which constructs are modeled in terms of interactions between their constituent factors, have rapidly gained popularity in psychology. Applications of such network approaches to various psychological constructs have recently moved from a descriptive stance, in which the goal is to estimate the network structure that pertains to a construct, to a more comparative stance, in which the goal is to compare network structures across populations. However, the statistical tools to do so are lacking. In this article, we present the network comparison test (NCT), which uses resampling-based permutation testing to compare network structures from two independent, cross-sectional data sets on invariance of (a) network structure, (b) edge (connection) strength, and (c) global strength. Performance of NCT is evaluated in simulations that show NCT to perform well in various circumstances for all three tests: The Type I error rate is close to the nominal significance level, and power proves sufficiently high if sample size and difference between networks are substantial. We illustrate NCT by comparing depression symptom networks of males and females. Possible extensions of NCT are discussed.

In recent years, network models have been proposed as an alternative representation of psychometric constructs such as depression. In such models, the covariance between observables (e.g., symptoms like depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness, and guilt) is explained in terms of a pattern of causal interactions between these observables, which contrasts with classical interpretations in which the observables are conceptualized as the effects of a reflective latent variable. However, few investigations have been directed at the question how these different models relate to each other. To shed light on this issue, the current paper explores the relation between one of the most important network models-the Ising model from physics-and one of the most important latent variable models-the Item Response Theory (IRT) model from psychometrics. The Ising model describes the interaction between states of particles that are connected in a network, whereas the IRT model describes the probability distribution associated with item responses in a psychometric test as a function of a latent variable. Despite the divergent backgrounds of the models, we show a broad equivalence between them and also illustrate several opportunities that arise from this connection.

Previous research and methodological advice has focused on the importance of accounting for measurement error in psychological data. That perspective assumes that psychological variables conform to a common factor model. We explore what happens when data that are not generated from a common factor model are nonetheless modeled as reflecting a common factor. Through a series of hypothetical examples and an empirical reanalysis, we show that when a common factor model is misused, structural parameter estimates that indicate the relations among psychological constructs can be severely biased. Moreover, this bias can arise even when model fit is perfect. In some situations, composite models perform better than common factor models. These demonstrations point to a need for models to be justified on substantive, theoretical bases in addition to statistical ones.

Networks are gaining popularity as an alternative to latent variable models for representing psychological constructs. Whereas latent variable approaches introduce unobserved common causes to explain the relations among observed variables, network approaches posit direct causal relations between observed variables. While these approaches lead to radically different understandings of the psychological constructs of interest, recent articles have established mathematical equivalences that hold between network models and latent variable models. We argue that the fact that for any model from one class there is an equivalent model from the other class does not mean that both models are equally plausible accounts of the data-generating mechanism. In many cases the constraints that are meaningful in one framework translate to constraints in the equivalent model that lack a clear interpretation in the other framework. Finally, we discuss three diverging predictions for the relation between zero-order correlations and partial correlations implied by sparse network models and unidimensional factor models. We propose a test procedure that compares the likelihoods of these models in light of these diverging implications. We use an empirical example to illustrate our argument.

Recent research has suggested that a range of psychological disorders may stem from a single underlying common factor, which has been dubbed the p-factor. This finding may spur a line of research in psychopathology very similar to the history of factor modeling in intelligence and, more recently, personality research, in which similar general factors have been proposed. We point out some of the risks of modeling and interpreting general factors, derived from the fields of intelligence and personality research. We argue that: (a) factor-analytic resolution, i.e., convergence of the literature on a particular factor structure, should not be expected in the presence of multiple highly similar models; and (b) the true underlying model may not be a factor model at all, because alternative explanations can account for the correlational structure of psychopathology.

Background Cognitive vulnerability theories of depression outline multiple, distinct inferential biases constitutive of cognitive vulnerability to depression. These include attributing negative events to internal, stable, and global factors, assuming that negative events will lead to further negative consequences, and inferring that negative events reflect negative characteristics about the self. Extant research has insufficiently examined these biases as distinct, limiting our understanding of how the individual cognitive vulnerability components interrelate and confer risk for depression symptoms. Thus, we conducted exploratory network analyses to examine the relationships among the five components of negative cognitive style and explore how components may differentially relate to depressive symptoms in adolescents. Methods Participants completed measures of negative cognitive style twice over a two‐year period. We estimated Graphical Gaussian Models using contemporaneous data and computed a cross‐lagged panel network using temporal data from baseline and 2‐year follow‐up. Results Results reveal interesting structural dynamics among facets of negative cognitive style and depressive symptoms. For example, results point to biases towards stable and future‐oriented inferences as highly influential among negative cognitive style components. The temporal model revealed the internal attributions component to be heavily influenced by depressive symptoms among adolescents, whereas stable and global attributions most influenced future symptoms. Conclusions This study presents novel approaches for investigating cognitive style and depression. From this perspective, perhaps more precise predictions can be made about how cognitive risk factors will lead to the development or worsening of psychopathology.