Merger control authorities may approve a merger based on an "efficiency defense." An important aspect in clearing mergers is that the efficiencies need to be merger-specific. Joint ventures, and in particular research joint ventures (RJVs), may achieve comparable efficiencies possibly without the anticompetitive (market power) effects of mergers. We empirically account for the endogenous formation of mergers and RJVs and provide evidence that at the semiconductor level, mergers and RJVs achieve dominant (net) efficiency effects. Our counterfactuals provide evidence that the efficiency gains caused by mergers would have been achieved by RJVs as well. Therefore, RJVs often represent viable alternatives to mergers from the consumer welfare point of view. At the more disaggregate level we find that the efficiency effects are larger in the microcomponents than in the memory market. This finding emphasizes the importance of market determinants (such as product differentiation and entry) having an impact on efficiency and market power effects. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In this article, we examine why it is difficult to induce firms to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We examine various incentives and disincentives for RJV formation by estimating an endogeneous switching model using data from the US National Cooperative Research Act. The empirical findings support hypotheses that firms of different sizes have disincentives to form RJVs and that cost-sharing is an important incentive for RJV participation. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
Previous studies on the measurement of learning-by-doing emphasize the importance of accounting for multi-vintage effects having an impact on firms' production costs through economies of scope. This study shows that accounting for cannibalization effects on the demand side is equally important for the adequate measurement of learning. Since multi-vintage firms anticipate the demand-side cannibalization effects in their production optimization, a previously omitted incentive to decrease production is captured having an impact on the measurement of learning by doing. We derive an empirical model from a dynamic oligopoly game of learning-by-doing and allow cannibalization effects to enter from the demand side. Using quarterly firm-level data for the dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we find support for cannibalization effects entering firms' pricing relations resulting in higher estimated learning effects. Abstract Previous studies on the measurement of learning-by-doing emphasize the importance of accounting for multi-vintage effects having an impact on firms' production costs through economies of scope. This study shows that accounting for cannibalization effects on the demand side is equally important for the adequate measurement of learning. Since multi-vintage firms anticipate the demand-side cannibalization effects in their production optimization, a previously omitted incentive to decrease production is captured having an impact on the measurement of learning by doing. We derive an empirical model from a dynamic oligopoly game of learning-by-doing and allow cannibalization effects to enter from the demand side. Using quarterly firm-level data for the dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we find support for cannibalization effects entering firms' pricing relations resulting in higher estimated learning effects. JEL: C1, L1, L6, O3.
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Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identified a tradeoff between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this tradeoff, using a sequential procurement auction with private cost information and varying information revelation policies. Specifically, the Complete Information Policy, where all submitted bids are revealed between auctions, is compared against the Incomplete Information Policy, where only the winning bid is revealed. The experimental results are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. For example, bidders pool with other types to prevent an opponent from learning significantly more often under a Complete Information Policy. Also as predicted, the procurer pays less when employing an Incomplete Information Policy only when the market is highly competitive. Bids are usually more aggressive than the risk neutral quantitative prediction, which is usually consistent with risk aversion. JEL: C91, D44, D82.
Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which firms' patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom to operate.Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to ex post licensing.It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post, while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results support these theoretical predictions.JEL: L13, L49, L63.
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