Firms have considered various forms of incentives for writing reviews, including the use of extrinsic rewards to attract reviewers. Building on this literature, we study the implications of monetary incentives on online reviews in the context of a natural experiment, where one review platform suddenly began offering monetary incentives for writing reviews. We refer to this as the treated platform. Along with data from Amazon.com and using the difference-in-differences approach, we compare the quantity and quality of reviews before and after rewards were introduced in the treated platform. We find that reviews are significantly more positive but that the quality decreases. Taking advantage of the panel data, we also evaluate the effect of rewards on existing reviewers. We find that their level of participation after monetary incentives decreases but not their quality of participation. Last, even though the platform enjoys an increase in the number of new reviewers, disproportionately more reviews appear to be written for highly rated products. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2017.0750 .

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S oftware vulnerability disclosure has become a critical area of concern for policymakers. Traditionally, a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) acts as an infomediary between benign identifiers (who voluntarily report vulnerability information) and software users. After verifying a reported vulnerability, CERT sends out a public advisory so that users can safeguard their systems against potential exploits. Lately, firms such as iDefense have been implementing a new market-based approach for vulnerability information. The marketbased infomediary provides monetary rewards to identifiers for each vulnerability reported. The infomediary then shares this information with its client base. Using this information, clients protect themselves against potential attacks that exploit those specific vulnerabilities.The key question addressed in our paper is whether movement toward such a market-based mechanism for vulnerability disclosure leads to a better social outcome. Our analysis demonstrates that an active unregulated market-based mechanism for vulnerabilities almost always underperforms a passive CERT-type mechanism. This counterintuitive result is attributed to the market-based infomediary's incentive to leak the vulnerability information inappropriately. If a profit-maximizing firm is not allowed to (or chooses not to) leak vulnerability information, we find that social welfare improves. Even a regulated market-based mechanism performs better than a CERT-type one, but only under certain conditions. Finally, we extend our analysis and show that a proposed mechanism-federally funded social planner-always performs better than a market-based mechanism.

Geographically dispersed sellers in electronic reverse marketplaces such as those hosted by market-makers like Ariba are uncertain about the number of competitors they face in any given market session. We refer to this uncertainty about the number of competitors as market-structure uncertainty. Over the course of several market sessions sellers learn about the competitive nature of the marketplace. How they learn to reduce the market-structure uncertainty depends on the market-transparency scheme, or the revelation policy adopted. A revelation policy determines the extent to which information--the number of sellers in a session, their bidding patterns, etc.--is revealed to sellers. Because these policies control what sellers learn and how they bid in future sessions, they determine buyer surplus. Possibly because market-structure uncertainty is more prevalent in information technology-enabled marketplaces than traditional ones, prior work has not addressed the impact of revelation policies on this type of uncertainty. Currently, there is little guidance available to buyers in choosing the appropriate revelation policy. To address this information-technology-enabled problem, we use game theory to compare the buyer surplus generated under a set of revelation policies commonly used in electronic reverse marketplaces. We demonstrate that the policy that generates the least amount of market-structure uncertainty for the sellers always maximizes buyer surplus. We further investigate to provide intuition regarding how bidders' reactions to overcome uncertainty differs with the nature of uncertainty, and how those reactions impact buyer surplus.market transparency, electronic markets, information systems, IT policy and management, economics of IS

Firms often disclose information security risk factors in public filings such as 10-K reports.The internal information associated with disclosures may be positive or negative. In this paper, we are interested in evaluating how the nature of security risk factors disclosed, which is believed to represent the internal information regarding information security, is associated with future breach announcements. For this purpose, we build a decision tree model, which classifies the occurrence of future security breaches based on the textual contents of the disclosed security risk factors. The model is able to accurately associate disclosure characteristics with breach announcements about 77% of the time. We further explore the contents of the security risk factors using text mining techniques to provide a richer interpretation of the results. The results show that the security risk factors with action-oriented terms and phrases are less likely to be related to future incidents. We also conduct a cross-sectional analysis to study how the market interprets the nature of information security risk factors in annual reports at different time points.We find that the market reaction following the security breach announcement is different depending on the nature of disclosure. Thus, our paper contributes to the literature in information security and sheds light on how market participants can better interpret security risk factors disclosed in financial reports at the time when financial reports are released.