Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach *In this paper we investigate how telecommunications infrastructure affects economic growth. This issue is important and has received considerable attention in the popular press concerning the creation of the "information superhighway" and its potential impacts on the economy. We use evidence from 21 OECD countries over the past twenty years to examine the impacts that telecommunications developments may have had. We estimate a structural model which endogenizes telecommunication investment by specifying a micro-model of supply and demand for telecommunication investments. The micromodel is then jointly estimated with the macro-growth equation. After controlling for country-specific fixed effects, we find evidence of a positive causal link, provided that a critical mass of telecommunication infrastructure is present. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Telekommunikations-Infrastruktur und Wirtschaftsentwicklung: Ein simultanes ModellIn diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, welchen Einfluß die Telekommunikations-Infrastruktur auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ausübt. Diese wichtige Frage hat im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion um "Informationsautobahnen" Aktualität erlangt. In der vorliegenden Studie wird der Einfluß der Telekommunikations-Infrastruktur für 21 OECDLänder für die vergangenen 20 Jahre analysiert. Es wird ein Strukturgleichungsmodell geschätzt, in dem Investitionen in die Telekommunikations-Infrastruktur als endogene Variable erfaßt werden und in einem Mikromodell Angebot und Nachfrage nach Telekommunikations-Investitionen spezifiziert werden. Das Mikromodell wird dann zusammen mit der Makro-Wachstumsgleichung geschätzt. Als Ergebnis stellen die Autoren dann eine positive Kausalbeziehung zwischen Telekommunikations-Investitionen und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung fest, wenn eine kritische Masse an TelekommunikationsInfrastruktur existiert.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu Terms of use: Documents in Revised version October 2004Abstract This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. By contrast, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel.JEL classification numbers: D72, D78, 040

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 167 EU mergers between 1990 and 2002 and evaluate their competitive consequences by the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual and the optimal decision as indicated by the stock market in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission's decisions cannot be solely accounted for by protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as influence is concerned, however, our data suggests that the commission's decisions are not sensitive to firms' interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors -such as market definition and procedural aspects, as well as country and industry effect -do play a significant role. Terms of use: Documents in

The purpose of this discussion paper is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a system be designed to account for efficiency gains? The report is divided into five separate parts. The discussion paper is based on a report to the European Commission. To help answer the two questions we start with an extensive review of the relevant economic research, including both theoretical and empirical work. Next, we review the current practice in seven O.E.C.D. jurisdictions. Finally, we propose a merger control system, emphasising the central role of informational limitations.

Using data on prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the Norwegian cement industry cartel. We find that our marginal cost estimates are very much in line with the detailed cost accounting data. We show that the cement cartel has been ineffective because the sharing rule induces "overproduction" and exporting below marginal costs. It is consumers -- not firms -- who benefit from the sharing rule. The ineffectiveness of the cartel was becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would be positive around 1968, which is when the merger actually took place! We also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample.

We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents' investments encourage provision of regulated access.

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