2012
DOI: 10.1086/661196
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Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms

Abstract: We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus … Show more

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Cited by 133 publications
(68 citation statements)
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References 37 publications
(24 reference statements)
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“…According to the ICT related empirical literature, the dynamics of the adoption process, which is due to network effects or consumer inertia, as well as of the investment process, which is mainly determined by the extent of adjustment costs, can be captured by including the lagged dependent variable as an additional righthand side explanatory variable (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002;Grajek & Röller, 2011). In view of the discussion presented in sections 3 and 4, the dynamic reduced-form models, in which NGN investment (superscript c denotes coverage in equation 1) and NGN adoption (superscript a denotes adoption in equation 2) are expressed in logs 17 for EU member state i and year t, read as follows: …”
Section: Dynamic Ngn Investment and Adoption Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the ICT related empirical literature, the dynamics of the adoption process, which is due to network effects or consumer inertia, as well as of the investment process, which is mainly determined by the extent of adjustment costs, can be captured by including the lagged dependent variable as an additional righthand side explanatory variable (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002;Grajek & Röller, 2011). In view of the discussion presented in sections 3 and 4, the dynamic reduced-form models, in which NGN investment (superscript c denotes coverage in equation 1) and NGN adoption (superscript a denotes adoption in equation 2) are expressed in logs 17 for EU member state i and year t, read as follows: …”
Section: Dynamic Ngn Investment and Adoption Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the related literature (e.g. Grajek & Röller, 2011) suggests that there might be reverse causality patterns between investment decisions on the one hand and regulation or competition variables on the other. GMM estimators provide us with internal instruments, which appears to be a superior strategy to using external instruments in view of a sufficient number of time periods (t = 9) and as we have to treat several independent variables as (potentially) endogenous.…”
Section: Estimation and Identification Strategymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…maksimalaus pelno gavimą. Natūraliųjų monopolijų veiklos reguliavimo būtinybė (DeVany, Walls, 1994;Peltzman, Winston, 2001;Toivanen, Waterson, 2005;Hori, Mizuno, 2006;Horvath, 2011;Goldfarb, Mo, 2011;Grajek, Röller, 2012;Minamihashi, 2012 ir kituose darbuose) grindžiama tokiomis nuostatomis:…”
Section: Natūralių Monopolijų Reguliavimo Nuostatosunclassified