Why Firms Form (or don't Form) RJVs

Röller, Lars‐Hendrik; Siebert, Ralph; Tombak, Mihkel M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.875421

Cited by 14 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…On the other hand, Clark and Sand (2010) find that, while the insiders cut their research efforts somewhat and the outsider increases research, the total effect tends to drive industry costs apart when only the more efficient firms join in a venture. Contrary to the findings of Roller et al (2007), this effect increases industry asymmetry when research joint ventures are present, raising industry profits but also those of the insiders. Indeed, consumers prefer the arrangement where the most efficient firms venture together to any other: free riding is moderate in this case, while efficiencies in research can reduce costs significantly.…”

Section: Spillovers: a Menu Of Effects And A Diversity Of Outcomes 21contrasting

confidence: 93%

“…As in the empirical study by Roller et al (2007), Clark and Sand (2010) find that asymmetric firms are less likely to join together to form a joint venture. Their results also are consistent with Gugler and Siebert's (2007) empirical observation that larger firms are more likely to participate in research joint ventures.…”

Section: Spillovers: a Menu Of Effects And A Diversity Of Outcomes 21mentioning

confidence: 68%

“…This raises questions of how organizations exchange knowledge, how they manage knowledge flows to obtain maximum competitive advantage, and how society could promote these knowledge flows to enhance welfare. Knowledge can pass from one organization to another in a variety of ways, including via mergers (Ang and Wu, 2011;Jost and Van de Velden, 2006), sale or licensing (Anton and Yao, 2002;Buenstorf and Geissler, 2009), technology pools (Lerner and Tirole, 2004;Lerner et al, 2007), open source protocols (Lerner and Tirole, 2002), joint investment projects (Goyal et al, 2003), demonstrations (Gill, 2008), inter-organizational spillovers (De Bondt, 1997) and research joint ventures (Amir et al, 2003;Suzumura, 1992;Roller et al, 2007). Three of the papers in this volume, Cassiman et al (2010), Squicciarini (2010) and Clark and Sand (2010) study aspects of spillovers.…”

Section: Overview Of the Papersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Perspectives on the Knowledge-Based Society. An Introduction to the Special Issue

Rockett

2012

Economics

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Section: Spillovers: a Menu Of Effects And A Diversity Of Outcomes 21contrasting

confidence: 93%

Section: Spillovers: a Menu Of Effects And A Diversity Of Outcomes 21mentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Overview Of the Papersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perspectives on the Knowledge-Based Society. An Introduction to the Special Issue

Rockett

2012

Economics

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“…Hence, production is dependent on the sum or the average of the marginal costs in a firmpair rather than the difference in marginal costs in a firm-pair. A mean-preserving spread in marginal costs will leave the industry quantities and prices unchanged (see also Roeller, Siebert, and Tombak (2007) for a similar argument). Hence, the difference in marginal costs between merging firms does not have an effect on combined market shares.…”

Section: Selection Into Mergers (Premerger Heterogeneity)mentioning

confidence: 90%

Heterogeneous Merger Impacts on Competitive Outcomes

Siebert

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Mergers realize heterogeneous competitive effects on profits, production, and prices. To date, it is unclear whether differential merger outcomes are caused mostly by firms' technology or product market attributes. Furthermore, empirical merger studies conventionally assume that, conditional on regressors, the impact of mergers on outcomes is the same for every firm. We allow the merger responses to vary across firms, even after controlling for regressors, and apply a random-coefficient or heterogeneous treatment effect model (in the context of Angrist and Krueger (1999), Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), and Cerulli (2012)). Based on a comprehensive dataset on the static random access memory industry, we find that firms' postmerger output further increases (and postmerger price further declines) if merging firms are more efficient, operate in more elastic product markets, are more innovative, and acquire knowledge in technological areas that are relatively unexplored to themselves. A further interesting insight is that product market characteristics cause stronger postmerger outcome heterogeneities than do technology market characteristics. We also find that the postmerger effects accounting for heterogeneities differ greatly from those that consider homogeneous postmerger outcome effects. Our estimation results provide evidence that ignoring heterogeneous outcome effects can result in heterogeneity bias, just as ignoring premerger heterogeneities can lead to selectivity bias. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: L110, L130, L520, O310, O320, O380.Keywords: heterogeneous treatment effects, horizontal mergers, market power effects, merger evaluation, premerger heterogeneity, postmerger heterogeneity. Ralph Siebert

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“…• public support (Abramovsky et al, 2005;Negassi, 2004;Busom and Fernandez-Ribs, 2004) • export activities (Dachs et al, 2004;Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2004) • size (Röller et al, 1997;Link and Bauer, 1987;Fritsch and Lukas, 2001) • industry Tether, 2002) …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%