We build on an emerging strategy literature that views the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities, and examine conditions that contribute to the realization of sustainable economic rents. Because of (1) resource-market imperfections and (2) discretionary managerial decisions about resource development and deployment, we expect firms to differ (in and out of equilibrium) in the resources and capabilities they control. This asymmetry in turn can be a source of sustainable economic rent. The paper focuses on the linkages between the industry analysis framework, the resource-based view of the firm, behavioral decision biases and organizational implementation ksues. It connects the concept of Strategic Industry Factors at the market level with the notion of Strategic Assets at the firm level.Organizational rent is shown to stem from imperfect and discretionary decisions to develop and deploy selected resources and capabilities, made by boundedly rational managers facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intrafirm conflict.

This paper examines the multiple scenario approach as an important corporate innovation in strategic planning. Using a participant/observer perspective, I examine how scenario planning tries to meet certain methodological, organizational and psychological challenges facing today's senior managers. Three prime characteristics are identified as setting the scenario approach apart from more traditional planning tools: (1) the script or narrative approach, (2) uncertainty across rather than within models, and (3) the decomposition of a complex future into discrete states. After exploring the intellectual roots of scenario planning, I examine such organizational aspects as the need for diversity of views and the importance of simplicity and manageability. Both benefits and obstacles to using scenarios in organizations are identified. Cognitive biases are examined as well, especially the well‐known biases of overconfidence and the conjunction fallacy. Two experiments test the impact of scenarios on people's subjective confidence ranges. Another two experiments test the internal coherence of subjects' beliefs. The psychological benefit of scenario planning appears to tie in the exploitation of one set of biases (e.g., conjunction fallacies) to counteract another (such as overconfidence).

The world in which today's businesses operate has become not only riskier but also more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). Organizations that hew too closely to traditional ways of operating will be hampered in their ability to succeed. In contrast, those that focus on new product and process developments coupled with business model innovation will leverage their dynamic capabilities. An essential overlay is entrepreneurial leadership from top management teams. Strong dynamic capabilities are impossible without it. This article examines how business model innovations, dynamic capabilities, and strategic leadership intertwine to help organizations thrive in VUCA worlds.

No abstract

Certainty equivalence (CE) and probability equivalence (PE) methods are the two most frequently used procedures for constructing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. In this paper, we compare these methods experimentally, using a two-stage within-subject design. By asking subjects first for a CE judgment and later for a related PE judgment (or vice versa), a consistency test is devised which any deterministic expectation model, including those allowing probability transformations, should meet. Using four related experiments, this consistency test is applied separately to gain and loss questions, and to the two sequences of linked equivalence judgments, namely CE-PE and PE-CE. The empirical results reveal serious inconsistencies between the CE and PE responses for each of the four experiments. The extent of discrepancy depends strongly on the subject's initial risk attitude and whether the gain or loss domain is examined. To explain the complex pattern of results, the second part of the paper explores several plausible hypotheses. The first of these concerns the role of random error, in either the responses or the utility function itself. It is shown that both can lead to bias, although not of a type that could explain our results. Thereafter shifts in reference points are examined. A particular reframing of the PE response mode is postulated in which a pure gamble is psychologically translated into a mixed one, leading to increased risk aversion. This hypothesis, which is also supported by other evidence, offers a complete and simple explanation of the results. Finally, several other behavioral hypotheses are examined, after developing a weighted average model to simulate them. They concern anchoring effects, differences in salience between the probability and outcome dimensions, strategic misrepresentation, regret or rejoice influences, and endowment effects. Although each hypothesis predicts some type of bias, none of these five could singly explain the particular pattern of bias observed. In general, the study demonstrates (1) that serious discrepancies exist between the CE and PE methods of utility measurement, (2) that the particular results are incompatible with traditional deterministic choice models, (3) how random response errors, through propagation, can induce systematic biases in the utility function, (4) that reframing of the PE mode offers a simple reference shift explanation of the complex findings, and (5) how various heuristics and biases can be operationalized and simulated to assess their effects on utility measurement. As such, this study represents a further step toward a systematic investigation of response mode biases in utility measurement.utility/preference theory, estimation, information processing, heuristics and biases, framing