Using only ordinal axioms, we characterize several multigroup school segregation indices: the Atkinson Indices for the class of school districts with a given fixed number of ethnic groups and the Mutual Information Index for the class of all districts. Properties of other school segregation indices are also discussed. In an empirical application, we document a weakening of the effect of ethnicity on school assignment from 1987/8 to 2007/8. We also show that segregation between districts within cities currently accounts for 33% of total segregation. Segregation between states, driven mainly by the distinct residential patterns of Hispanics, contributes another 32%. Properties of other school segregation indices are also discussed. In an empirical application, we document a weakening of the effect of ethnicity on school assignment from 1987/8 to 2007/8. We also show that segregation between districts within cities currently accounts for 33% of total segregation. Segregation between states, driven mainly by the distinct residental patterns of Hispanics, contributes another 32%. * Email addresses: dfrankel@iastate.edu; ovolij@bgu.ac.il. Volij thanks the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (project SEJ2006-05455) for research support. Measuring School Segregation

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This paper examines the problem of measuring intellectual influence based on data on citations between scholarly publications. We follow an axiomatic approach and find that the properties of invariance to reference intensity, weak homogeneity, weak consistency, and invariance to splitting of journals characterize a unique ranking method. This method is different from those regularly used in economics and other social sciences. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)

We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

We study how professional players and college students play zero-sum twoperson strategic games in a laboratory setting. We first ask professionals to play a 2x2 game that is formally identical to a strategic interaction situation that they face in their natural environment. We find that these subjects play in the laboratory exactly as in the field, that is as the equilibrium of the game dictates: (i) they equate payoffs across strategies, and (ii) generate sequences of choices that are random. In sharp contrast with them, however, we also find that college students play the game far from the equilibrium predictions. We then study the behavior of professional players and college students in the classic O'Neill's 4x4 zero-sum game, a game that none of the subjects have encountered previously, and find the same drastic differences in behavior between these two subject pools. The transfer of skills and experience from the familiar field to the unfamiliar laboratory observed for professional players is relevant, from a methodological perspective, to evaluate the circumstances under which behavior in a laboratory setting may be a reliable indicator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting. From a cognitive perspective, it is useful for research on recognition processes, intuition, and similarity as a basis for inductive reasoning. * We thank Jose Apesteguia, Pedro dal Bó, Vicki Bogan, Juan Carrillo, the late Jean Jacques Laffont, Ana I. Saracho, Jesse Shapiro, and audiences at various seminars and conferences for helpful comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to the general managers of the soccer clubs that granted access to the players that participated in this study, and to the Universidad del País Vasco for its hospitality. We gratefully acknowledge generous financial support from the Salomon Foundation and the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (grant BEC2003-08182). Pedro dal Bó provided the dice. Data and programs are available upon request. Any errors are our own.

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Consider the problem of ranking social alternatives based on the number of voters that prefer one alternative to the other. Or consider the problem of ranking chess players by their past performance. A wide variety of ranking methods have been proposed to deal with these problems. Using six independent axioms, we characterize the fair-bets ranking method proposed by Daniels [4] and Moon and Pullman [14].