The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach

Dagan, Nir; Volij, Oscar

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(93)90024-d

Cited by 106 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…For simplicity, let = f . The next result is parallel to one obtained by Dagan and Volij (1993) in a di¤erent framework. 9 Proposition 3.1 The -asymmetric Nash solution for = f induces the additive CSF (5).…”

Section: ' Classical'bargainingsupporting

confidence: 60%

“…The analysis exploits the observation that these problems are mathematically related -but not equivalent -to the problem of assigning win probabilities in contests. A main result here follows Dagan and Volij (1993) and shows that the class of contest success functions given in (5) can be understood as the weighted Nash bargaining solution where e¤orts represent the weights of the agents. We turn then to the framework of bargaining with claims (Chun and Thomson (1992)) to incorporate explicitly the contestants'e¤orts in the description of the problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Notice that it is straightforward to extend the last result to more than three contestants (see (9)). 11 Interestingly, this recommendation di¤ers in the minimal e¤ort necessary to obtain a non-zero share and in the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort from the one based on Example 7. De…nition 3.3 equalizes losses based on absolute claims.…”

Section: Proposition 32 the Proportional Solution Induces The Additimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Foundations for contest success functions

Corchón

Dahm

2008

Econ Theory

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In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the …rst we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into di¢ culties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the de…nition of new ones.

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Section: ' Classical'bargainingsupporting

confidence: 60%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proposition 32 the Proportional Solution Induces The Additimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Foundations for contest success functions

Corchón

Dahm

2008

Econ Theory

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“…It turns out that well known claims rules can, in this fashion, be described by classical bargaining solutions. For instance, if we apply the Nash bargaining solution [6], we observe that (i) it provides the same allocation when applied to the problem pSpE, cq, dq, and when applied directly to the conflicting claims problem pE, cq; and (ii) it coincides with the constrained equal awards rule [7]. Nevertheless, in general bargaining solutions do not coincide when applied to problems pSpE, cq, dq and pE, cq.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Giménez-Gómez

Osório

Peris

2015

Games

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Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.

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“…Theorem 2.3 can be seen as a generalization of Dagan and Volij (1993) who showed that the constrained equal award rule for bankruptcy problems corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of an appropriately chosen bargaining problem.…”

Section: So By Case 1 We Have Xs -Argmax{r[;esy;~y E X(es't)} and Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

1996

Self Cite

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AbatractThe uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different iormulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and reatricted monotonicity.

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The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach

Abstract: We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

Cited by 106 publications

References 9 publications

Foundations for contest success functions

Foundations for contest success functions

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

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