A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

Dagan, Nir; Serrano, Roberto; Volij, Oscar

doi:10.1006/game.1997.0526

Cited by 83 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…An early example of lifting is given by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997). We also note that have shown, and exploited the fact, that certain properties of rules are lifted by a version of consistency that they call "average consistency".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 79%

On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency

Hokari

Thomson

2008

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims in the context of a variable population. A property of rules is "lifted" if whenever a rule satisfies it in the two-claimant case, and the rule is bilaterally consistent, it satisfies it for any number of claimants. We identify a number of properties that are lifted, such as equal treatment of equals, resource monotonicity, composition down and composition up, and show that continuity, anonymity and self-duality are not lifted. However, each of these three properties is lifted if the rule is resource monotonic.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 79%

On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency

Hokari

Thomson

2008

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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“…given two problems (N, E′,c,a′,w) and (N,E,c,a,w) such that ∑ i∈N c i ≥ E′>E, and for any i,j∈N such that c j ≥c i , a i =a j and w i =w j , and the ratio of an individual's asset in the two problems is proportional to E′/E, i.e. This property says that if total assets increase due to proportionate increase in individual assets, an agent with a greater claim receives no less share of the increment than the other (Dagan et al 1997). …”

Section: Order Preservation Under Claims Variationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

Mianabadi

Mostert

Pande

et al. 2015

Water Resour Manage

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One significant problem of transboundary river basins causing various challenges and disputes throughout the world is that because of increasing water resource variability and consumption, the water demand often exceeds water availability. Hence, one of the main challenges in transboundary river basin management is how to allocate the available water among the riparian states equitably and reasonably. In this study, we propose a novel weighted bankruptcy solution method to cope with the problem of demands or Bclaims^exceeding resources or Bassets^. Certain desirable key properties of the proposed method are provided. Furthermore, we investigate its application to the Tigris River, a shared river among Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as a real case. The available water is allocated under two different situations: homogeneous and heterogeneous group. We use the Shapley Value and compare the solution with other allocation methods applied in this study. The results suggest that this new rule may facilitate negotiation in solving conflict over the allocation of water in transboundary river basins.

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“…Super-modularity (Dagan et al (1997)) requires that if the amount to divide increases, given two individuals, the one with the greater claim experiences a larger gain than the other.…”

Section: Resource Monotonicity: For Each (E C) ∈ B and Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum

Giménez-Gómez

Peris

2014

European Journal of Operational Research

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In distribution problems, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P ) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, when using the egalitarian division, agents may receive more than her claim. We propose a compromise between the proportional and the egalitarian solutions by considering the restriction that no one receives more than her claim. We show that the most egalitarian compromise fulfilling this restriction ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and it can be interpreted as a process that works in two steps as follows: first, all agents receive an equal share up to the smallest claim (egalitarian distribution), and then the remaining estate (if any) is allocated proportionally to the remaining claims (proportional solution). Finally, we obtain that the recursive application of this process finishes at the Constrained Equal Awards solution (CEA).

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A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

Cited by 83 publications

References 14 publications

On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency

On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency

Weighted Bankruptcy Rules and Transboundary Water Resources Allocation

A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum

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