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While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind (emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.

The aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called “strong” versions of embodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful in explaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensory processes, yet they have failed to offer a comprehensive understanding of abstract concepts (e.g., freedom). In this regard, this article pinpoints three areas where the SVEC face limitations. First, the SVEC fail to fully support the active or passive perspective that an agent may assume when processing abstract concepts via embodied metaphorical representations. Second, the SVEC do not offer a compelling explanation for three different types of mental simulation proposed for the representation of nonactual motion semantics: enactive perception, perceptual scanning, and imagination. Third, the SVEC fail to account for inter-individual, cross-cultural, and context-dependency in the representation of abstract concepts. To summarize, we argue that the findings from the SVEC should be integrated into broader “weak” embodiment theoretical perspectives, which propose that sensory–motor and modality-independent systems are involved in conceptual representations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our core argument in cognitive neuroscience.

The avoidance of directly addressing human mortality indicates fear of death. This fear elicits psychological, social and religious interdictions in language such that people resort to the use of metaphors to avoid confronting death. Under the premise that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from a concrete source to an abstract target domain, this study aims to identify and categorize euphemistic metaphors of death in six languages: Chinese, Farsi, Gĩkũyũ, Russian, Spanish, and Swedish. Those metaphors are interpreted via the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). In doing so, 40 speakers in each of the languages were asked to complete a short questionnaire. Various metaphors of death were identified in each language and categorized into four conceptual metaphors:death is a journey; death is the end; death is a rest; anddeath is a summons. The key finding is that the most common metaphor of death isdeath is a journey. This holds across linguistic groups regardless of gender and age factors. This study also discusses the role of embodied cognition theories in accounting for how metaphors of death are created and their role within cognition in general.

This article discusses a specific type of metaphor in which an abstract non-motion domain is described in terms of a motion event. Abstract non-motion domains are inherently different from concrete motion domains. However, motion domains are used to describe abstract non-motion domains in many metaphors. Three main reasons are suggested for the suitability of motion events in such metaphorical descriptions. Firstly, motion events usually have high degrees of concreteness. Secondly, motion events are highly imageable. Thirdly, components of any motion event can be imagined almost simultaneously within a three-dimensional space. These three characteristics make motion events suitable domains for describing abstract non-motion domains, and facilitate the process of online comprehension throughout language processing. Extending the main point into the field of mathematics, this article discusses the process of transforming abstract mathematical problems into imageable geometric representations within the three-dimensional space. This strategy is widely used by mathematicians to solve highly abstract and complex problems.

Metaphors are cognitive and linguistic tools that allow reasoning. They enable the understanding of abstract domains via elements borrowed from concrete ones. The underlying mechanism in metaphorical mapping is the manipulation of concepts. This article proposes another view on what concepts are and their role in metaphor and reasoning. That is, based on current neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, it is argued that concepts are grounded in perceptual and motor experience with physical and social environments. This definition of concepts is then embedded in the Structure-Mapping Theory (SMT), a model for metaphorical processing and reasoning. The blended view of structure-mapping and embodied cognition offers an insight into the processes through which the target domain of a metaphor is embodied or realised in terms of its base domain. The implications of the proposed embodied SMT model are then discussed and future topics of investigation are outlined.

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