PurposeLibraries as they are known today can be defined by the term Library 1.0. This defines the way resources are kept on shelves or at a computer behind a login. These resources can be taken from a shelf, checked out to the librarian, taken home for a certain length of time and absorbed, and then taken back to the library for someone else to use. Library 1.0 is a one‐directional service that takes people to the information that they require. Library 2.0 – or L2 as it is now more commonly addressed as – aims to take the information to the people by bringing the library service to the internet and getting the users more involved by encouraging feedback participation. This paper seeks to present an overview of Library 2.0.Design/methodology/approachThis paper presents an overview of Web 2.0 including definitions, technologies involved and sites currently advocated as examples of Web 2.0.FindingsThe major difference between Library 1.0 and L2 is that Library 1.0 only allows for a one‐way flow of information while L2 is a read‐write library that gives library users the power to decide the service that they get. L2 reinforces the role libraries play in the community by building on today's best and continually improving the service. L2 can be summarized as being user‐driven and aiming to save each library user time in retrieving information.Originality/valueLibraries have been around for centuries and are considered places in which books, journals, CDs, etc. are kept for reference or for borrowing by the public. The term L2 was believed to have been first made by Michael Casey in his blog LibraryCrunch. Chad and Paul Miller describe Library 2.0 (L2) as a concept, very different from the service one knows today, that operates according to the expectations of today's users. They state that with this concept the library will make information available wherever and whenever the user requires it. One point to note here is that this concept is not about replacing the 1.0 technology already being used but rather about adding additional functionality.

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This chapter develops a social theory of great power status competition rooted in the struggle for recognition. It argues that great power status—in all its variants—is a kind of state identity, and as a result rising powers need to obtain recognition from the established powers to secure their position in the international order. Consistent with the logic of the struggle for recognition, rising powers adhere to a specific set of recognitive practices—great power voice, exemplary military power, and spheres of influence—that are designed to reduce social uncertainty and give the illusion that the rising power’s social status is not dependent on other states’ recognition responses. When a rising power is recognized by the established powers, its use of these recognitive practices is deemed legitimate and the power transition is peaceful. If the rising power is misrecognized, a self-fulfilling prophecy is set into motion whereby its growing power and assertive foreign policy are perceived to be for revisionist purposes and thus must be contained by the established powers. Revisionism, in this view, is not an intrinsic property of states, but rather is socially constructed through a rising power’s interactions with the established powers.

How can established powers manage the peaceful rise of new great powers? With The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations, the author offers a new answer to this perennial question in international relations, arguing that power transitions are principally social phenomena whereby rising powers struggle to obtain recognition of their identity as a great power. At the center of great power identity formation is the acquisition of particular symbolic capabilities—such as battlesheips, aircraft carriers, or nuclear weapons—that are representative of great power status and that allow rising powers to experience their uncertain social status as a brute fact. When a rising power is recognized, this power acquisition is considered legitimate and its status in the international order secured, leading to a peaceful power transition. If a rising power is misrecognized, its assertive foreign policy is perceived to be for revisionist purposes, which must be contained by the established powers. Revisionism—rather than the product of a material power structure that encourages aggression or domestic political struggles—is a social construct that emerges through a rising power’s social interactions with the established powers as it attempts to gain recognition of its identity. The question of peaceful power transition has taken on increased salience in recent years with the emergence of China as an economic and military rival of the United States. Highlighting the social dynamics of power transitions, this book offers a powerful new framework through which to understand the rise of China and how the United States can facilitate its peaceful rise.

Dynamic linking in modern execution environments like .NET is considerably more sophisticated than in the days of C shared libraries on UNIX. One aspect of this sophistication is that .NET assemblies embed type information about dynamically linked resources. This type information implicitly represents compile-time assumptions about the resources available at run-time. However, the resources available at run-time may differ from those available at compiletime. For example, the execution environment on a mobile phone might provide fewer, simpler classes than on a desktop PC. As bytecode cannot adapt to its execution environment, component reuse is restricted and development costs are increased. We have designed and implemented a "flexible" dynamic linking scheme that binds bytecode as late as possible to the assemblies and classes available in a .NET execution environment. We describe the scheme's integration with the .NET linking infrastructure, review important design decisions and report on experiences with the "Rotor" shared source version of .NET.

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This chapter clarifies the relationship between recognition and state identity formation in international anarchy, highlighting the effects of social uncertainty in this process. Acts of recognition are constructive of a state’s identity, providing it with the authority it needs to act in ways that are consistent with its self-understanding and endowing it with a recognized social status in the international order. This inherently social process of identity formation is deeply uncertain because states can never discern beforehand the recognition responses of other states and as a result state interaction is fraught with the danger of misrecognition. In response to this ongoing social uncertainty, states attempt to take independent control over the meaning of their identities by grounding them in concrete material practices. As an effective expression of an identity, the material world gives substance to the recognition-seeking state’s aspiring social identity and allows it to experience its social status as a brute fact, rather than as the uncertain effect of an ongoing political practice of social construction.