The Social Construction of Revisionism

Abstract

This chapter develops a social theory of great power status competition rooted in the struggle for recognition. It argues that great power status—in all its variants—is a kind of state identity, and as a result rising powers need to obtain recognition from the established powers to secure their position in the international order. Consistent with the logic of the struggle for recognition, rising powers adhere to a specific set of recognitive practices—great power voice, exemplary military power, and spheres of influence—that are designed to reduce social uncertainty and give the illusion that the rising power’s social status is not dependent on other states’ recognition responses. When a rising power is recognized by the established powers, its use of these recognitive practices is deemed legitimate and the power transition is peaceful. If the rising power is misrecognized, a self-fulfilling prophecy is set into motion whereby its growing power and assertive foreign policy are perceived to be for revisionist purposes and thus must be contained by the established powers. Revisionism, in this view, is not an intrinsic property of states, but rather is socially constructed through a rising power’s interactions with the established powers.

Kazakhstan’s Quest for Status: A Secondary State’s Strategy to Shape Its International Image

“…Kazakhstan's peaceful status-seeking behavior diverges from a number of studies (Krickovic & Weber, 2018;Larson & Shevchenko, 2003;Murray, 2019;Renshon, 2017;Ward, 2017) that depict status-seeking states as embracing malevolent behavior internationally. Due to this variance, and especially Kazakhstan's cooperative actions regarding its nuclear weapons, it is important to examine this neglected case in the IR literature.…”

Status Competition: The BRICS’ Quest for Influence in Global Governance

“…Recognition would also mean that the identity of the state is constructed, thereby allowing it to practice that which was not present before. Murray is also careful to note that the process of identity formation is an uncertain path and states cannot know beforehand whether their desire to be recognised will be realised or not (Murray 2019, 46).…”

“…Status, thus, in this approach is subjective and not intersubjective as it is based on recognition. It is also based on others’ perception of the actor’s attributes and achievements in that regard and how responses to that value are considered by the other actor (Murray 2019, 45). It is worth recounting William Wohlforth’s arguments on unipolarity and status competition in this context.…”

China's pursuit of international status through negotiated deference: an empirical analysis of Italy's parliamentary attitude

“…Status is a constitutive component of social life (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990) and as such it is widely debated among scholars, including in the IR community (Corbetta et al ., 2013; Paul et al ., 2014; Ward 2017; Zhang, 2017; Duque, 2018; Baxter et al ., 2018; Renshon, 2017; Murray, 2019; Wood and Cox, 2021). Empirical evidence suggests that human beings tend to experience a basic desire for status (Anderson et al ., 2015, 593), to the point that they may strive to acquire material goods not for the security and well-being they procure, but exclusively for their status-enhancing properties (Snidal, 2002).…”

“…Precisely on account of its perceived value in a system in flux, a growing body of scholarship in the last two decades has explored how the conduct of states seeking to increase their own status can generate significant international tensions and even precipitate conflicts (Horowitz et al ., 2005; Murray, 2019). When leaders conclude that their country, relative to specific circles of recognition, is not enjoying the status it ‘deserves’ in accordance with its capabilities – in terms of military might, economic strength, instruments of influence or symbolic-regulatory resources – dissatisfaction develops that may easily turn into outright grievance (Renshon, 2016, 516).…”