China's pursuit of international status through negotiated deference: an empirical analysis of Italy's parliamentary attitude

Abstract

Italy's controversial decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding for collaboration on the Belt and Road Initiative with China in 2019 has been widely debated. This article seeks to break new ground by offering a theory-informed contribution investigating the rationale behind Beijing's own commitment in the negotiations leading to the signing of the BRI MoU. It argues that the Chinese government accepted the risks involved in the process for the sake of promoting an accelerated advancement in China's positioning in the international status hierarchy through negotiation of deference against agency with Italy. The article empirically probes the extent to which such a strategy of status enhancement on China's part is sustainable over time. Based on a content analysis of all China-related political stances expressed in ordinary non-legislative policy-setting acts tabled in both Houses of the 18th Italian Parliament, from March 2018 through to August 2021, the article suggests that China's strategy is hardly sustainable. In fact, the steady deterioration of China-related sentiment among Italian Members of Parliament as a consequence of Beijing's policies towards Hong Kong, the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) outbreak, and Xinjiang matches the expectations of previous scholarship on international status as it confirms that social closure mechanisms discussed in the literature prevail over foreign policy consistency when the status-seeking actor is perceived as crossing critical normative thresholds.

China-US Competition

“…Italy's decision to adhere to the BRI falls in this sub-category of "return-maximizing" options: it reflects deeper engagement than economic pragmatism and binding engagement on account of the powerful symbolic impact of a G7 country lending legitimacy to one of Beijing's key agendas (Andornino 2022), but it falls short of limited bandwagoning for it does not envisage regular alignment with China on Italy's part. Political timing, political expediency and political personnel-not any fundamental shift of the country's strategic posture-are the factors that help explain Italy's conduct under the first government nominally led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, but effectively run by the leaders of a two-party populist coalition comprising the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League (Lega).…”

“…The characterisation of China by Matteo Salvini, the Lega leader, on his official Facebook and Twitter accounts-reaching some 5 million followers-is a reminder of why China may yet find the League a less palatable interlocutor in years to come: of the 93 posts mentioning China through to August 2019, 78.5% reflected a negative view of China as either an unfair competitor (34.4%), a source of health hazards (9.7%), or anyway a country with questionable cultural compatibility with Italy (14%). Less immediately visible, but equally as revealing, is the fact that, at the time, virtually the entire parliamentary group of the Lega in the Senate of the Republic-the upper chamber of Parliament-and over 1/3 of the Lega members of the Chamber of Deputies publicly championedthrough motions, parliamentary questions and tabled legislation-positions that run counter to China's core interests, supporting in particular Taiwan's attempts to increase its presence in international organisations (Andornino 2022). Such apparent scepticism vis-à-vis Beijing among Italian MPs, even in the face of an unprecedented China-friendly realignment in the foreign policy priorities of their own government, is one of the most salient factors anchoring Italy to Bloomfield's "hedging zone" within the China balancing-bandwagoning continuum.…”

“…In particular, a diachronic examination of the sentiment of the five main Italian parties, as manifested by their China-related stances in salient non-legislative acts of parliamentary policy-setting and oversight, suggests a steady deterioration in the perception of China as a viable partner by Italian MPs (Andornino 2022). After an initial phase of more positive attitudes during the Conte I government, a sharp reduction in positive stances can be noticed during the Conte II government, and none at all features since the beginning of the Draghi government through to the Spring of 2022.…”

Germany and Nord Stream 2: evolution and end of an incongruous policy

“…The 'question of ethics' (Brasset and Holmes 2010) incorporated in these viewpoints is commonly directed against capitalism, in whole or part. It also applies to normative clashes or 'thresholds' (Andornino 2022) in compacts between (ideal-type) liberal-democratic and authoritarian states. Nord Stream 2 is one such case, in which two indispensable participants-the territorial points of departure and arrival of the pipeline-are an aggressive autocratic state and a peaceful, with a significant pacifist element, liberaldemocratic state.…”