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This article examines economic efficiency (EE) of crop production of Russian corporate farms for 1993-1998. EE declined over the period, due to declines in both technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency (TE) results indicate that output levels could have been maintained while reducing overall input use by an average of 29-31% in 1998, depending on the method used, while the allocative efficiency (AE) results show that costs could have been reduced about 30%. The EE scores show that Russian corporate farms could have increased efficiency by reducing the use of all inputs, particularly fertilizer and fuel. Russian agriculture inherited machinery-intensive technology from the Soviet era, which may be inappropriate given the relative abundance of labor in the post-reform environment. Investment constraints have prevented the replacement of old machinery-intensive technology with smaller scale machines that allow for a more labor-using technology. Copyright 2006 International Association of Agricultural Economics.

This paper examines whether there has been cross-country convergence among yields for selected crops important to Russia and the New Independent States. The only crop that showed yield convergence globally was wheat, although several crops in sub-samples displayed convergence. In the reform era, Russian yields for several crops declined, leading to gaps between Russia and the global yield leaders that are wider now than in the study's initial starting period (1962). These findings are consistent with recent studies showing declining efficiency in the reform era. Input price liberalization and institutional constraints exerted downward pressure on yields, offsetting gains achieved by opening up to the global market. Comparative Economic Studies (2001) 43, 59–81. doi:10.1057/ces.2001.8

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is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its programs, facilities, and employment without regard to race, religion, color, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or veteran status.

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Summary Can Russia be competitive inAgriculture? Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid‐1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis‐à‐vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4–5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years–with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports–and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russepourrait‐elle être compétitive ? Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro‐fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro‐fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable q...

Nonreciprocal trade preference programs originated in the 1970s under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as an effort by high-income developed countries to provide tariff concessions for low-income countries. The goal of the programs was to increase export earnings, promote industrialization, and stimulate economic growth in the lower income countries. This study analyzes detailed trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Union (the two largest nonreciprocal preference donors) to determine the extent to which the programs have increased exports from beneficiary countries. For those products where the margins of preference are large and where beneficiaries have a comparative advantage and the capacity to expand prodution, these programs can create adequate incentives leading to a growing export market. The analysis finds that the programs offer significant benefits for some countries, mostly the higher income developing countries. Economic benefits in the least developed countries have been modest. An unanswered question is whether these gains will continue after the incentives are reduced.