In the 2000s, Russia emerged as a major player in world agricultural markets, on both the supply (mainly grain) and demand side. This article examines Russia's agricultural transition experience, which has resulted in a complex system of diverse producers and institutions, as well as uneven performance. Using a model of transition agriculture, the article explores how key reform policies drove systemic change and commodity restructuring, and how the ensuing changes in the production, consumption, and trade of goods have affected world markets. The article also assesses the performance of Russian agriculture during transition, and provides an outlook for the future.

This article examines how Russia’s economic crisis and ban on agricultural imports from the United States and other Western countries that began in 2014 have impacted its agricultural and food sector. The import ban was a Russian response to geopolitical tension with the West stemming from the country’s conflict with Ukraine, while the main cause of the economic crisis was a plunge in world oil prices. Given that the bulk of Russia’s export earnings come from oil and other energy products, the oil price decline triggered a major depreciation of the ruble against the US dollar and other major currencies. Ruble depreciation and the import ban have affected Russian consumers by reducing Russia’s imports of agricultural and food products, substantially raising food prices, and lowering consumption. However, the country’s basic food availability has not been threatened. By increasing domestic prices, the depreciation and import ban have stimulated agricultural production. The added output has reduced meat imports and raised grain exports. Russian meat imports in 2014–2016 (average annual) were about 40% lower compared to 2011–2013, while grain exports in 2014–2016 were 50% higher than in 2011–2013 (though production-enhancing favorable weather was also a cause).

Russia's transition to a market economy in the early 1990s shocked its agricultural sector, creating the potential for profit and gains from specialisation and productivity improvements. However, subsequent regional agricultural development has been highly uneven, and the sources of the sector's productivity improvement remain unclear. Drawing on a newly‐assembled Russian regional farm production and policy dataset, we evaluate agricultural total factor productivity growth from 1994 to 2013, decomposing that growth into technical progress and efficiency gains, for the nation as a whole and for the major agricultural districts of the South and Central. We then test how investments in road and rail infrastructure and human capital have influenced those gains. The South substantially outperformed the Central district and the nation at large with respect to all three performance indicators. However, contrary to the literature, we find that these particular state policies provided no substantial growth advantages, there or elsewhere. Rather, the dominant force behind Russia's agricultural growth has been informal technical change.

Russia has moved from being a large importer of grain, soybeans, and soybean meal during the late Soviet period to a major grain exporter. The country has become the world’s top wheat exporter, supplying 20–23 percent of total world exports in 2017–2018. This article examines how Russia’s transition from a planned to a market economy that began in the early 1990s has led to substantial restructuring of its agricultural production and trade, especially in its livestock and grain sectors. The article also discusses the consequences of that restructuring for world agricultural markets, and presents outlook for Russia’s agricultural trade. Another key development is that the country’s livestock sector contracted by about half during the 1990s, a result being Russia became a big meat importer. However, since 2000 that sector has rebounded, and meat imports (especially of chicken and pork) have fallen considerably.

Since 2000, Russia has substantially increased grain production and exports. The grain output growth has come from a rise in yields rather than area. After falling heavily during the 1990's, grain area stabilized during the 2000's and has remained flat, at about two-thirds the level of the late Soviet period. Using data on the regional structure of Russian grain production costs, this paper examines the country's potential to increase grain output further by returning the lost grain area to production. The analysis finds that if grain area were to grow beyond a certain level, that is still well below the level of the late Soviet period, production costs would rise steeply. Therefore, any major expansion in grain area would require that world grain prices rise considerably beyond their level in the early 2010's, to cover the high marginal costs of production.