Strategy is central to politics. Wars, elections, treaties, negotiations, and other outcomes we substantively care about depend on on the strategies that actors adopt to pursue their interests. Strategy is also one of the few political science concepts with widespread utility outside of the classroom. Students who grasp what it means to act, compete, and cooperate strategically will have a decisive edge in the war room, boardroom, or courtroom.Unfortunately, teachers who want to expose students to this critical way of thinking have few eff ective tools at their disposal. This is especially true at the undergraduate level. From Clausewitz to Schelling, the canonical literature on strategy centers on abstract concepts and game-theoretic principles that are diffi cult for students to grasp. Even contemporary national-security strategy documents are a poor model for how to think strategically. Rather than focusing on dynamic tactics, they tend to read like "laundry lists" of goals and objectives. This overlooks the most important aspect of any strategic interaction: that is, the other side also has a say in the outcome.Crisis simulations provide a better pedagogical tool for teaching students about strategy, strategic interactions, and strategic competition. Studies suggest that simulation exercises improve learning outcomes by grounding abstract concepts in concrete experience and allowing students to gain understanding of them through both active experimentation and problem solving. 1 Moreover, unlike lectures and small-group discussions, simulations can be purposefully designed to induce real strategic interaction.In 2011, in an eff ort to teach strategic thinking, the Center for International Security Studies (CISS) at Princeton University-as In an eff ort to teach strategic thinking, the Center for International Security Studies at Princeton University designed an adaptable model for crisis simulation that could be used in a variety of institutional contexts and with diverse content matter. Moreover, the simulation helped students to develop an understanding of several other important abstract concepts in political science: notably, information uncertainty, friction or "the fog of war," and bureaucratic stove piping. This article describes the design, content, and implementation of our original simulation. It is based on a "loose-nukes" scenario resulting from the hypothetical collapse of the Pakistani state. We conclude by evaluating the benefi ts and limitations of the simulation and by suggesting ways in which it could be implemented in other institutional contexts. part of its broader Strategic Education Initiative (SEI)-designed an adaptable model for crisis simulation that could be used in a variety of institutional contexts and with diverse content matter. 2 The simulation helps students to develop a conceptual understanding of several important abstract concepts in political science: notably, information uncertainty, friction or "the fog of war," and bureaucratic pathologies such as stove piping. Michae...
The Baltic States are once again worried that their security is under threat. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have responded with air patrols, joint exercises, and battalion-sized ground force deployments. As important as these efforts have been, they do not fully address Russia's anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) and precision strike capabilities, both of which undermine NATO's stratagem for deterring aggression in the first place. This article assesses the current military imbalance and describes two conflict scenarios in order to show how A2AD and precision weapons threaten extended deterrence. It concludes with a discussion of the policy implications. The Baltic States-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania-are once again worried that their security is under grave threat. They fear that Russia could undertake subversive and hostile action against them under the pretext of safeguarding the interests of local Russian-speaking populations. 1 They also worry that Russia could use the same 'hybrid' approach (orchestrated by Moscow and supported by the Russian military, but executed by pro-Russian partisans, militias and intelligence operatives) as it did in Crimea in early 2014 to achieve its aims. 2 To address such concerns, the US and fellow members of NATO have taken steps to bolster defence of the Baltic States and to improve deterrence.
Open Access Copy-Please Do Not Cite Published in Journal of Strategic Studies 38(6): 777-800 "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." -Clausewitz, On War In this article, we evaluate Farrell's model, complemented with additional insights from the broader organizational change and military innovation literatures, against new archival material from the British counterinsurgency campaign in the Southern Cameroons . We argue that this small-scale war is a most-likely case for adaptation given existing theory: the British army has a strong reputation as a 'learning institution' and has been praised for the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency efforts in the twilight years of empire. The British forces in the Southern Cameroons, moreover, possessed all of Farrell's preconditions. Explanatory failure in such a most-likely case would call into question existing explanations, highlight important scope conditions, and provide fertile ground for generating new theoretical insights.We find that, in the Southern Cameroons, although the British military did successfully detect their operational shortcomings, they nevertheless failed to adapt to changing enemy tactics. By 1961, the insurgents had gained control over significant tracts of territory and posed an even greater threat to security than they had just a year previously. Yet, instead of changing tactics as units on the ground demanded, the British pulled out and handed over the Southern Cameroons to the newly independent state of Cameroon despite the presence of a strong, active insurgency.Archival materials suggest that this failure had political roots, highlighting a fundamental flaw in the military adaptation literature: that it ignores politics. Existing work on adaptation is overly technocratic and limited to tactical and operational considerations, thereby overlooking the crucial political imperatives, trade-offs, and opportunity costs that can impel or impede military change. Documentary evidence indicates that British politicians chose to sacrifice military effectiveness for broader strategic and political interests, thus subverting bottom-up adaptation. British leaders decided that winning on the ground in the Southern Cameroons would require delaying decolonization and committing greater numbers of combat troops, risking both their international reputation and a domestic popular backlash. This is a crucial point too often overlooked in analyses of military change. Scholars often axiomatically assume that operational efficiency is the only or most important goal during military engagements. Yet, as Clausewitz implored us to remember, war is ultimately an extension of politics. Political leaders must balance and prioritize a multitude of strategic interests, leading to decisions and outcomes that may seem counterproductive when viewed from the tactical level. Current Understandings of Military AdaptationThe literature on military change, framed by the debate between...
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