Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Lanoszka, Alexander; Hunzeker, Michael A.

doi:10.1080/09636412.2015.1103135

Cited by 8 publications

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“…The entrapment problem has generally been articulated in terms of the risks posed to the strong state in the alliance in question. For the strong state, entrapment results because the state fears abandoning even a reckless client because of reputational costs (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Lanoszka and Hunzeker 2015; Onea 2014), ideology (Driscoll and Maliniak 2016), or issue slippage (Mearsheimer 2014; Posen 2015). In the context of South Korea, then, scholars of entrapment might be concerned that the United States would find itself embroiled in a conflict with North Korea caused by provocation from South Korea.…”

Section: Theories Of Nuclear Security Guaranteesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Sukin

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client? Conventional wisdom suggests that when nuclear security guarantees are not credible, support for proliferation will be high, since a domestic nuclear capability offers an alternative source of deterrence. I introduce a new theory, which posits that highly credible security guarantees can backfire by causing some individuals to fear their ally might miscalculate—either by using nuclear weapons in an unnecessary preventative attack or by precipitous escalation of a crisis or conflict. Survey experiments conducted among representative samples of South Korean citizens in 2018 and 2019 support this theory, showing that increases in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee lead to increased support for nuclear proliferation among South Korean respondents.

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Section: Theories Of Nuclear Security Guaranteesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Sukin

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…No other framework has as much influence. Of the sixteen pieces that do not apply or endorse Larson and Shevchenko's version of SIT, eight are not aimed at explaining how states seek status (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014;Onea 2014;Jones 2014;Wolf 2014b;Dolan 2015;Lanoszka and Hunzeker 2015;Renshon 2015;Sambanis et al 2015). The rest apply a mix of theoretical perspectives rooted in a variety of mechanisms and hypotheses.…”

Section: Status and Social Identity In World Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics

Ward

2017

International Studies Quarterly

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Chinese and Russian foreign policy, in part, reflects both countries' ambitions for higher status in the international system. This implies a critical question: can accommodating these ambitions prevent, or even reverse, the turn toward geopolitically competitive grand strategies by Moscow and Beijing? In other words, might accommodation lead them to channel their efforts in more benign directions? The dominant framework for analyzing the ways in which states seek status-a framework rooted in the insights of Social Identity Theory (SIT)-suggests that the answer is yes: status-seekers will most likely turn toward geopolitically competitive strategies when they face apparently "impermeable" obstacles to their ambitions. I argue that this framework depends on a "mistranslation" of SIT. Properly translated, the theory tells us little about the consequences of persistent status denial for international politics. Instead, it implies that status-seeking will resolve into geopolitical competition when, first, participants view geopolitically significant resources as markers of status and, second, when leaders believe that they can successfully change the distribution of status. I use analyses of two prominent cases that should prove friendly ground for the conventional translation of SIT-Germany before World War I and Imperial Japan-to demonstrate the serious problems that plague the framework favored by international relations scholars, especially with respect to its central claim about the link between persistent status denial and geopolitical competition.

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Speaking with one voice: Coalitions and wartime diplomacy

Min

2022

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea

Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics

Speaking with one voice: Coalitions and wartime diplomacy

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