Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Abstract

Open Access Copy-Please Do Not Cite Published in Journal of Strategic Studies 38(6): 777-800 "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." -Clausewitz, On War In this article, we evaluate Farrell's model, complemented with additional insights from the broader organizational change and military innovation literatures, against new archival material from the British counterinsurgency campaign in the Southern Cameroons . We argue that this small-scale war is a most-likely case for adaptation given existing theory: the British army has a strong reputation as a 'learning institution' and has been praised for the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency efforts in the twilight years of empire. The British forces in the Southern Cameroons, moreover, possessed all of Farrell's preconditions. Explanatory failure in such a most-likely case would call into question existing explanations, highlight important scope conditions, and provide fertile ground for generating new theoretical insights.We find that, in the Southern Cameroons, although the British military did successfully detect their operational shortcomings, they nevertheless failed to adapt to changing enemy tactics. By 1961, the insurgents had gained control over significant tracts of territory and posed an even greater threat to security than they had just a year previously. Yet, instead of changing tactics as units on the ground demanded, the British pulled out and handed over the Southern Cameroons to the newly independent state of Cameroon despite the presence of a strong, active insurgency.Archival materials suggest that this failure had political roots, highlighting a fundamental flaw in the military adaptation literature: that it ignores politics. Existing work on adaptation is overly technocratic and limited to tactical and operational considerations, thereby overlooking the crucial political imperatives, trade-offs, and opportunity costs that can impel or impede military change. Documentary evidence indicates that British politicians chose to sacrifice military effectiveness for broader strategic and political interests, thus subverting bottom-up adaptation. British leaders decided that winning on the ground in the Southern Cameroons would require delaying decolonization and committing greater numbers of combat troops, risking both their international reputation and a domestic popular backlash. This is a crucial point too often overlooked in analyses of military change. Scholars often axiomatically assume that operational efficiency is the only or most important goal during military engagements. Yet, as Clausewitz implored us to remember, war is ultimately an extension of politics. Political leaders must balance and prioritize a multitude of strategic interests, leading to decisions and outcomes that may seem counterproductive when viewed from the tactical level. Current Understandings of Military AdaptationThe literature on military change, framed by the debate between...

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