This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution between individuals who differ in their lifespans. We discuss aspects related to the objective function and argue that aversion to multiperiod inequality should be taken into account. Then, we study the properties of the social optimum both with full information and with asymmetric information. We highlight the role of aversion to multiperiod inequality and show that it has substantial consequences on the design of Social Security schemes. In particular, we show that for a low (resp. high) aversion to multiperiod inequality, a negative (resp. positive) implicit tax rate on continued activity is desirable. JEL classification: D63, H55, H23, I31Mortalité différentielle et sécurité sociale. Ce mémoireétudie le problème normatif de la redistribution entre individus qui ont des durées de vie différentes. On discute certains aspects reliésà la fonction objective et on montre que l'aversionà l'inégalité sur plusieurs périodes doitêtre prise en compte. Onétudie les propriétés de l'optimum socialà la fois dans les cas d'information complète et d'information asymétrique. On souligne le rôle de l'aversionà l'inégalité sur plusieurs périodes, et on montre qu'elle a des conséquences importantes sur le design des régimes de sécurité sociale. En particulier, on montre que pour une faible (haute) aversionà l'inégalité, un taux d'imposition implicite négatif (positif) sur la continuation des activités est désirable.
Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.
A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime, and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare (ex ante), allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies; (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare (ex post ), allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption pro…les, as well as raising the retirement age, unlike the ex ante egalitarian optimum. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities. Hence, the postponement of the retirement age can, quite surprisingly, be defended on egalitarian grounds -although the conclusion is reversed when mortality strikes only after retirement.
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses, while selection plays little role. (JEL D82, D83, G22, I13)
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