The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long working career. However, only workers who have a sufficiently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. To re‐examine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e., individuals work before being retired) with—hypothetical—reverse retirement (i.e., individuals are retired before working). We show that, under standard assumptions, an economy with reverse retirement, once in place, converges towards a unique stationary equilibrium. At the normative level, we show that, when labor productivity declines with age, reverse retirement cannot be optimal under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), whereas reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst‐off in realized terms). Finally, we show that there exists a set of policy instruments that allow a government to organize a successful transition from standard to reverse retirement.