Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Leroux, Marie‐Louise; Racionero, Maria

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001

Cited by 10 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Following Leroux et al . (), we adopt the unitary model of a household that has only one set of preferences:

U^{j} = 2 \cdot \{\frac{{(c^{j})}^{1 - σ} - 1}{1 - σ} + β \cdot \frac{{(d^{j})}^{1 - σ} - 1}{1 - σ}\}, j = c 1, c 2 .

Under this specification, spouses play cooperatively and share their resources over their life cycle…”

Section: Economic Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Leroux et al . () assume that the degree of derived pension rights is fixed. Instead, they allow for the presence of single males and females and examine how the degree of derived pension rights affects tax burden policy preferences for public pensions and thus a resulting pension system via voting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The results in Leroux et al . () provide significant policy predictions for public pensions. However, these results depend heavily on the following two assumptions: quasi‐linear utility and no borrowing constraints.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The aim of this paper is to relax these two assumptions in the framework of Leroux et al . () and to provide new insight into derived pension rights from a political‐economic viewpoint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This two‐toned effect, as well as the ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium, both of which were not shown in Leroux et al . (), are derived by the presence of a borrowing constraint associated with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

Ono

2016

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper develops an overlapping‐generations models featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one‐breadwinner couple, and two‐breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one‐breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing‐constrained one‐breadwinner couples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the former attain a higher benefit‐to‐cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two‐breadwinner couples produce an inverse U‐shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate.

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“…Following Leroux et al . (), we adopt the unitary model of a household that has only one set of preferences:

U^{j} = 2 \cdot \{\frac{{(c^{j})}^{1 - σ} - 1}{1 - σ} + β \cdot \frac{{(d^{j})}^{1 - σ} - 1}{1 - σ}\}, j = c 1, c 2 .

Under this specification, spouses play cooperatively and share their resources over their life cycle…”

Section: Economic Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The aim of this paper is to relax these two assumptions in the framework of Leroux et al . () and to provide new insight into derived pension rights from a political‐economic viewpoint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

Ono

2016

J Public Economic Theory

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The political economy of derived pension rights

Leroux

2011

Int Tax Public Finance

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Derived pension rights exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly targeted towards non-working wives and widows and are viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from a political economy process when the Social Security is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgian pillars. It also shows that derived rights tend to encourage stay-athome wives thus revealing an unpleasant trade-o § between female labor participation and poverty alleviation.

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What drives public acceptance of reforms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension reform

Parlevliet

2017

Public Choice

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Governments often find it hard to pursue economic reforms, even if they eventually will benefit a majority of voters. The literature remains inconclusive about the reasons for this. Some scholars, on the one hand, stress the role of distributional conflicts between different classes, for instance dividing the young and the old in the case of pay-asyou-go pensions. Others have highlighted that resistance to reform is rather broad-based owing to the public's poor understanding of the need for reform. This paper attempts to disentangle the drivers of public acceptance of reform by means of a case study: the 2012 increase of the Dutch statutory retirement age from 65 to 67. We exploit a unique longitudinal dataset on the attitudes of Dutch households respecting pension reform in the 2003-2013 period. Our findings offer various new insights. First, we find that education, occupational status and psychological traits were the most systematic drivers of reform preferences, while age had a limited impact. Second, and significantly, we find that the year fixed effects were the main drivers of respondents' acceptance of reform. We interpret the pattern of the year coefficients as evidence of a collective learning process whereby households gradually updated their expectations and reform preferences in light of new information.

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Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Cited by 10 publications

References 15 publications

Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

The political economy of derived pension rights

What drives public acceptance of reforms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension reform

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