No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

We argue that the common-law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher but somewhat imprecise standard may be interpreted as reflecting a trade-off between providing incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the common law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civil-law features. (JEL: D 8, K 4) * We wish to thank Thomas Gaube, Christian Kirchner, and Kathryn Spier for very helpful observations. The paper also benefited greatly from the many comments by the participants at the Max Planck Institute's "Game Theory and the Law" conference, 17-19 June 2004, Marienbad. The usual disclaimer applies. C. Fluet gratefully acknowledges financing from FQRSC (Quebec).

Risk perception, Predicted risk perception, Risk-taking behavior, Impaired driving, Traffic violation, Road accident, D81, C11, C13, K42,

This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses, while selection plays little role. (JEL D82, D83, G22, I13)

We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator.