The board of directors is one of a number of internal governance mechanisms that are intended to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned, and to discipline or remove ineffective management teams. Among the most significant governance issues currently faced by the modern corporation are those relating to diversity, such as gender and age, and independence of directors. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

This paper has three main aims. First, the paper introduces the concept of integrated reporting () as described by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). A background to the development of the concept over the 4‐year period from the inception of the IIRC in 2010 is provided, culminating in the release by the IIRC of a Consultation Draft (CD) of the framework in March 2013. Second, the paper discusses key issues currently being debated relating to the CD that the IIRC will need to resolve prior to the expected release of their framework in late 2013. This discussion is based on issues identified and reported to the IIRC by a subcommittee of the International Association for Accounting Education and Research (IAAER) comprised of international accounting academics. Finally, the paper identifies a range of potential research issues relating to the development and implementation of .

SUMMARY In this study, we report two 2 × 2 between-subjects experiments that investigate the effect of strategic relevance of reported sustainability information and its assurance on nonprofessional investors' investment decisions. The first experiment manipulates strategic relevance of reported environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indicators between “high” and “low” by varying the company strategy (sustainability-based differentiation strategy versus cost leadership strategy unrelated to sustainability). The second experiment manipulates the strategic alignment of the ESG indicators (holding strategy constant). We also manipulate the presence (absence) of assurance in both experiments. Results from both experiments document that investors perceive ESG indicators to be more important, and are more willing to invest in the company if ESG indicators have higher strategic relevance. Experiment one also provides evidence that assurance increases investors' willingness to invest to a greater extent when ESG indicators have high relevance to the company strategy. Our findings suggest that the assurance of ESG indicators has a beneficial signaling role in communicating the importance of this reported information to investors.

This study investigates whether and how managers' enabling perceptions of their costing systems affect task performance. We propose that managers who perceive their costing system as more enabling will have higher levels of task performance, and that this relationship occurs through the intensity with which the costing system is used and the level of psychological empowerment experienced by the managers. To test these propositions, we conduct a survey of middle-level managers and analyze the responses using a PLS model. Our results generally support our propositions. Specifically, we find a positive relationship between managers' enabling perceptions and the intensity with which the costing system is used. The intensity of use is further associated with all four dimensions of psychological empowerment (meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact). Finally, the intensity of use also has an indirect impact on task performance via the competence dimension of psychological empowerment. The present study extends prior research on costing systems, and adds to our understanding of the role managers' perceptions play in improving costing system effectiveness. Data Availability: Data available upon request.

This study examines the effect that two key balanced scorecard (BSC) framework elements-causal linkages between strategic objectives in the strategy map and performance measures categorized by scorecard perspective-have on managers' ability to interpret the strategic relevance of external information and use this information to evaluate the appropriateness of an organization's strategy. We conduct two experiments, finding that presenting a set of strategic objectives as a strategy map enhances both managers' information relevance and strategy appropriateness judgments. We attribute this improvement to the explication of causal linkages between objectives in a strategy map. In contrast, presenting performance measures categorized by scorecard perspective only improves managers' strategy appropriateness judgments when the managers are provided with a set of strategic objectives that are not presented in a strategy map structure. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that these two elements of the BSC framework have differential decision-facilitating impacts on managers' strategic judgments.

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This study proposes that organizations should consider project hurdle rates, as part of their control system design, to reduce escalation of commitment behavior in managers. In particular, we empirically examined the escalation of commitment tendencies in managers receiving organization-set, self-set, and no hurdle rates. Consistent with prior expectations, we found self-set hurdle rates to be an effective control mechanism resulting in significantly lower levels of escalation of commitment. Contrary to expectations, however, organization-set hurdle rates were not effective. Self-set hurdle rates also resulted in significantly higher cut-off rates compared to the average return of the investment portfolio held by the managers. As escalation of commitment has been recognized as a serious potential problem in organizations, the use of self-set hurdle rates is a step toward reducing the level of escalation tendencies in managers.

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