This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships between producers and retailers. It provides evidence on the links between the features of vertical contracts organizing franchising networks and the performances of these networks. An agency perspective is used to understand the structure of contracts. We focus on the relevance of vertical restraints by the upstream firm to prevent retailers from free‐riding in the distribution networks. From six frequent contractual provisions we distinguish two types of contracts according to the degree of constraint imposed on the franchisees. Econometric estimations carried out on this basis offer evidence consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, more constrained contracts for retailers encourage better performance at the network level.Vertical Restraints, Franchising Network Performance, Agency Theory, C12, L14,

International audienceThis article, deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining contracts for the retailers favour a better performance at the network level

This paper is interested in the analysis of Blockchains and Smart-contracts applied to inter-firms relationships, in particular the franchise networks. After defining the Blockchain technology and the Smartcontract as a particular type of contract stored in blockchains, we question the theory of contracts and its conception(s) of transactions, information asymmetries, firm or inter-firm relations. To better understand the challenges of blockchain for franchise networks and identify opportunities for implementation in these networks, we present some relevant applications of this technology. We identify different ways where blockchain technology could improve the network management and therefore their performance: the supply-chain, the brand-name protection, security and transparency in the payment of fees and royalties, access to reliable information via an oracle.

To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have examined the degree of vertical integration by comparing franchised and company‐owned chains. On the basis of recent data from the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper investigates the determinants of network integration in the French distribution systems. The level of network integration increases from franchised chains to company‐owned chains. This paper provides evidence that the level of network integration is positively related to the brand name value and negatively related to the resource constraints and monitoring costs of the upstream firm. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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