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Due to the issue of cost and benefit, the investment demand and consumption demand of micro-grids are insufficient in the early stages, which makes all parties lack motivation to participate in the development of micro-grid projects and leads to the slow development of micro-grids. In order to promote the development of micro-grids, the corresponding incentive mechanism should be designed to motivate the development of micro-grid projects. Therefore, this paper builds a multi-stage incentive model of micro-grid project development involving government, grid corporation, energy supplier, equipment supplier, and the user in order to study the incentive problems of micro-grid project development. Through the solution and analysis of the model, this paper deduces the optimal subsidy of government and the optimal cooperation incentive of the energy supplier, and calculates the optimal pricing strategy of grid corporation and the energy supplier, and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on optimal subsidy and incentive. The study reveals that the cost and social benefit of micro-grid development have a positive impact on micro-grid subsidy, technical level and equipment quality of equipment supplier as well as the fact that government subsidies positively adjust the level of cooperation incentives and price incentives. In the end, the validity of the model is verified by numerical analysis, and the incentive strategy of each participant is analyzed. The research of this paper is of great significance to encourage project development of micro-grids and to promote the sustainable development of micro-grids.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify the relationship between knowledge transfer characteristics in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, the influence of alliance governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer consequences and investigate the role of environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer of alliance. Design/methodology/approach – Survey data were collected mainly in high-tech industries of China, the firms in which often establish alliance for the purpose of learning and knowledge transfer often takes place in that alliance. Finally, 293 usable samples were included in subsequent analysis. Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the hypotheses. Findings – The extent of relational (/formal) governance mechanism used in alliance has a stronger positive relationship with the extent of tacit (/explicit) knowledge transfer in alliance than with the extent of explicit (/tacit) knowledge transfer in alliance between them; environmental uncertainty impairs relational governance mechanisms and enhances formal governance mechanisms used in alliance; both relational and formal governance mechanisms could facilitate knowledge transfer in alliance; environmental uncertainty hinders knowledge transfer and negatively moderates the relationship between alliance governance mechanisms and knowledge transfer. Originality/value – This paper finds the relationship between knowledge transfer in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, and the role of environmental uncertainty, providing managers with direct implications about how to manage alliance with different knowledge transfer characteristics for the purpose of facilitating knowledge transfer in alliance; provides managers more details about the dark side of the environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer, also reminds public policy-makers paying enough attention for the improvement of institutional environment to deal with uncertainty.

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This paper employs the evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid, with the discussion focusing on the factors that influence the game players’ selection of strategies, and additionally makes a numerical simulation analysis. The results of analysis based on the evolutionary game model suggest that the two parties’ undertaking of cooperative strategies and uncooperative strategies during the game is the stable point of their evolution and that the probability of their unanimous choice of cooperative strategies positively correlates with the direct benefits and indirect benefits of their cooperation as well as the government subsidies but negatively correlates with the cooperation costs and spending on cooperation risks. Based on the findings, the paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions aiming to deepen the cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid.

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Government subsidy is a powerful tool to motivate the development of a new energy industry. At the early stage of microgrid development, for the sake of the cost and benefit issue, it is necessary for the government to subsidize so as to support and promote the development of microgrids. However, a big challenge in practice is how to optimize the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain with varying targets and methods of subsidy. In order to explore this problem, we construct a subsidy model based on the microgrid industry chain, involving government, investor, operator, equipment supplier, and user. Through calculation and solution of this model, we obtain price and return indicators of each microgrid industry chain participant when the subsidy target differs. Based on that, we contrast and compare the optimal subsidy strategy and influencing factors when operational efficiency indicators vary. Finally, we validate and analyze this model with numerical analysis and discuss the impact of development stage, technological level, and change in subsidy amount on the operational efficiency of the microgrid industry chain and on the returns of each participant. This result is of great significance to subsidy practice for microgrids and the development of microgrids.

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