Knowledge transfer, governance mechanisms in alliance and environmental uncertainty

Yong, Long; Li, Peng; You, Bo

doi:10.1108/cms-07-2013-0129

Cited by 17 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 116 publications

(206 reference statements)

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“…Based on views of the social exchange theory, there is no complete legal protection to all parties involved in a social exchange (Emerson, 1976). As such, trust plays an important role in a social exchange to reduce people's fears (Gefen et al, 2003;Long et al, 2014) and to strengthen the relationship commitment (Xiao et al, 2010).…”

Section: The Role Of Trust In Electronic Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring trust transfer between internet enterprises and their affiliated internet-only banks

Zhang

Chen

Liu

et al. 2018

CMS

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Purpose With the development of information technology, there is a growing trend for internet enterprises in China to launch internet-only banks. This paper aims to explore how the brand trust in an internet enterprise is transferred to the initial trust in its affiliated internet-only bank and how such transfer affects adoption behavior of potential internet-only banking users. Design/methodology/approach Data were obtained from online questionnaires via a well-known Chinese survey website and a popular Chinese social platform, which yielded 486 usable responses for the analysis. Partial least squares was used for testing hypotheses. Findings The results show that brand trust in the internet enterprise increases initial trust in its affiliated internet-only bank. This, in turn, enhances the adoption of internet-only banking. More importantly, these results show that brand trust in the internet enterprise transfers to initial trust in internet-only banking through performance expectancy and perceived risk. Further, the need for interaction moderates the relationship between brand trust and performance expectancy as well as the relationship between brand trust and perceived risk. Originality/value This study provides new insights into the mechanism by which trust is transferred between two affiliated business entities. The results of the study suggest several useful managerial implications for managing the internet-only banks.

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Section: The Role Of Trust In Electronic Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring trust transfer between internet enterprises and their affiliated internet-only banks

Zhang

Chen

Liu

et al. 2018

CMS

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“…The measurement of uncertainty was divided into two aspects: environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty was measured by three items derived from Long et al ’s (2014) research and were appropriately modified according to the characteristics of the construction project. In addition, three items adapted from You et al (2018) were used to measure behavioral uncertainty.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The efficacy of trust for the governance of uncertainty and opportunism in megaprojects

Wang

Fang

2019

ECAM

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Purpose The low success rate of megaprojects stems from the opportunism triggered by uncertainty. Developing trust between participants is an effective means to reduce uncertainty, but this process is inevitably affected by contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of uncertainty on participants’ opportunism in megaprojects and the effect of trust on reducing uncertainty. At the same time, the moderating effects of contractual control are tested. Design/methodology/approach This research classifies trust into competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust and categorizes uncertainty into environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Partial least squares structural equation modeling is used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 172 respondents. Findings The results show a positive correlation between the two types of uncertainty and opportunism. For the governance of uncertainty, competence-based trust can reduce environmental uncertainty, but it is ineffective for behavioral uncertainty, and goodwill-based trust has a significant effect on both types of uncertainty. The test of moderating effects shows that contractual control strengthens the effect of competence-based trust but weakens the effect of goodwill-based trust, which means that contractual control complements competence-based trust and substitutes for goodwill-based trust. Research limitations/implications This research enriches the theory of megaproject management. First, it validates the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Second, this study clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust. Practical implications For practice, this research provides some implications for megaproject management. First, project managers should recognize that the match between trust and project uncertainty is key to the success of megaproject governance. For example, some megaprojects involve many organizations, and there are many difficulties in behavioral supervision and performance appraisal. Therefore, developing goodwill-based trust between participants through positive interactions is an effective means to reduce the behavioral uncertainty of all participants and to curb opportunistic behaviors. Originality/value This research validated the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Furthermore, it clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.

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“…e trusted members will also actively suppress their opportunistic tendencies [41], avoid the prisoner's dilemma of a single transaction, reduce the cost of contract signing and supervision, and facilitate repeated transactions.…”

Section: Joint Moderating Role Of Contract Governance and Relationship Governance Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Relationship between Intellectual Property Risk and Stability of Asymmetric Research and Development Alliance

Zhang

Guo

et al. 2021

Complexity

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Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) establish asymmetric research and development (R&D) alliance with core enterprises to improve innovation efficiency. Unfortunately, the gap in the status and bargaining power between enterprises in such partnerships makes the intellectual property risk situation complicated. While gaining support and assistance from core enterprises, SMEs face the risk of exposing their core knowledge and key resources, which seriously affects the stability of R&D alliance and the sustainability of cooperative innovation. How to protect the intellectual property rights of SMEs in the asymmetric R&D alliance and improve the alliance’s stability is an urgent problem to be solved. Based on the theory of resource dependence and transaction cost, this study uses 260 high-tech companies participating in the asymmetric R&D alliance as a sample to conduct empirical research from the perspective of SMEs in a weak position. The purpose of this study is to sort out the types of intellectual property risks in the alliance and clarify the relationship between them and the stability of asymmetric R&D alliance. Furthermore, this study examines the moderating effects of contract governance mechanisms and relational contracts to explore effective governance mechanisms at the alliance level. Empirical results show that the intellectual property investment risk and the intellectual property loss risk have a significant negative impact on the stability of asymmetric R&D alliance. The contract governance mechanism negatively moderates the impact of intellectual property investment risk on the stability of the asymmetric R&D alliance. The relationship governance mechanism negatively moderates the impact of intellectual property loss risk on the stability of the asymmetric R&D alliance. The contract and relationship governance mechanism jointly negatively moderate the impact of intellectual property investment risk and loss risk on the stability of the asymmetric R&D alliance.

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Knowledge transfer, governance mechanisms in alliance and environmental uncertainty

Cited by 17 publications

References 116 publications

Exploring trust transfer between internet enterprises and their affiliated internet-only banks

Exploring trust transfer between internet enterprises and their affiliated internet-only banks

The efficacy of trust for the governance of uncertainty and opportunism in megaprojects

The Relationship between Intellectual Property Risk and Stability of Asymmetric Research and Development Alliance

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