Previous research has conceptualized dispositional envy as a general construct that does not vary across comparison domains. In five studies (N = 1393), we examine dispositional envy as a domain‐specific construct. In Study 1, we present the development of a domain‐specific measure of dispositional envy. Across samples from different populations and two countries (Studies 2 and 3), the measure is shown to have good reliability, construct validity and stability over three months, highlighting the trait‐like character of the construct. State levels of envy were also examined in the academic domain (Study 4) and in dyadic interactions between unacquainted participants (Study 5). Results show a Person × Situation Interaction effect (i.e. Dispositional Envy × Situation) on experiences of envy. By placing domain‐specific dispositional envy into a network of similar and dissimilar constructs, the current findings serve as a foundation for drawing conclusions about the nature of dispositional envy. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology

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Replication studies in psychological science sometimes fail to reproduce prior findings. If these studies use methods that are unfaithful to the original study or ineffective in eliciting the phenomenon of interest, then a failure to replicate may be a failure of the protocol rather than a challenge to the original finding. Formal pre-data-collection peer review by experts may address shortcomings and increase replicability rates. We selected 10 replication studies from the Reproducibility Project: Psychology (RP:P; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) for which the original authors had expressed concerns about the replication designs before data collection; only one of these studies had yielded a statistically significant effect ( p < .05). Commenters suggested that lack of adherence to expert review and low-powered tests were the reasons that most of these RP:P studies failed to replicate the original effects. We revised the replication protocols and received formal peer review prior to conducting new replication studies. We administered the RP:P and revised protocols in multiple laboratories (median number of laboratories per original study = 6.5, range = 3–9; median total sample = 1,279.5, range = 276–3,512) for high-powered tests of each original finding with both protocols. Overall, following the preregistered analysis plan, we found that the revised protocols produced effect sizes similar to those of the RP:P protocols (Δ r = .002 or .014, depending on analytic approach). The median effect size for the revised protocols ( r = .05) was similar to that of the RP:P protocols ( r = .04) and the original RP:P replications ( r = .11), and smaller than that of the original studies ( r = .37). Analysis of the cumulative evidence across the original studies and the corresponding three replication attempts provided very precise estimates of the 10 tested effects and indicated that their effect sizes (median r = .07, range = .00–.15) were 78% smaller, on average, than the original effect sizes (median r = .37, range = .19–.50).

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The present investigation addresses the question of whether certain factors can protect high-achieving students at risk for being labeled a nerd against devaluation. In 2 studies, 125 and 317 students from Grade 8 evaluated vignettes describing average students and students who were called "nerds." Results indicate that being modest about good grades, being engaged in sports, and being sociable led to higher liking. In students who were labeled nerds, but not in average students, display of effort led to less favorable evaluations. The effects of the aforementioned factors were moderated by the gender of the perceivers and targets. Findings are discussed with respect to gender-role stereotypes and the self presentation of high-achieving students.

Emotional dysfunction is a key feature of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) but emotional intelligence (EI) has rarely been investigated in this sample. This study aimed at an investigation of ability EI, general intelligence, and self-reported emotion regulation in BPD. We included 19 patients with BPD and 20 healthy control subjects in the study. EI was assessed by means of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso emotional intelligence test and the test of emotional intelligence. For the assessment of general intelligence, we administered the multidimensional "Leistungsprüfsystem-Kurzversion." The emotion regulation questionnaire and the difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale were used to assess emotion regulation. The patients with BPD did not exhibit impairments of ability EI and general intelligence but reported severe impairments in emotion regulation. Ability EI was related both to general intelligence (patients and controls) and to self-reported emotion regulation (patients). In conclusion, emotional dysfunction in BPD might primarily affect self-perceived behavior rather than abilities. Intense negative emotions in everyday life may trigger dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies in BPD although patients possess sufficient theoretical knowledge about optimal regulation strategies.

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

Among well-acquainted people, those high on agentic narcissism are less popular than those low on agentic narcissism. That popularity-difference figures prominently in the narcissism literature. But why are agentic narcissists less popular? We propose a novel answer―the tit-for-tat hypothesis. It states that agentic narcissists like other people less than non-narcissists do and that others reciprocate by liking agentic narcissists less in return. We also examine whether the tit-for-tat hypothesis generalizes to communal narcissism. A large round-robin study ( N = 474) assessed agentic and communal narcissism (Wave 1) and included two round-robin waves (Waves 2-3). The round-robin waves assessed participants’ liking for all round-robin group members (2,488 informant-reports). The tit-for-tat hypothesis applied to agentic narcissists. It also applied to communal narcissists, albeit in a different way. Compared with non-narcissists, communal narcissists liked other people more and―in return―those others liked communal narcissists more. Our results elaborate on and qualify the thriving literature on narcissists’ popularity.