The characteristic asymmetry in intentionality attributions that is known as the Knobe effect can be explained by conjoining an orthodox theory of intentional action with a normative account of intentional omission. On the latter view: (a) omissions presuppose some normative context; (b) there are good reasons why the intentionality of omissions requires agents' knowledge rather than intention. The asymmetry in intentionality attributions in Knobe's cases can be seen to be derivative from an asymmetry in intentional omissions. The omissions account further explains the Butler problem and some related puzzles. It also safeguards the simple view of intentional action from the asymmetry challenge.
Anscombe noticed t h a t statements naturally interpreted as expressions of intentions (such as "I am going for a w a l k ) could also be interpreted as expressions of beliefs.' Indeed, philosophers of action have been struck by the close conceptual ties between intention and belief. So H. P. Grice observes that it would be awkward to express a n intention of doing something while denying that one believes that one will do it.2 He suggests that a n agent who intends to do something must believe that he will do it. This position has been subject to much scrutiny. In fact, a whole spectrum of views on the relation between intention and belief has been occupied-from the strong position on which the relation between them is that of logical implication, through weaker positions (such as the view that the relation is that of conversational implicature, or that what is implied is only the belief that the agent will try to do what he intends to do), to t h e position t h a t one can intend to do something while believing that it is impossible for one to do it.The aim of this paper is to look at the relation between intention and belief from a different angle. I will examine a different pair of concepts, namely, normative and predictive expectations, which bear a n important resemblance to the pair which gave so much heat to the debate. It is telling, for example, that Anscombe's observation also holds for normative expectations. Statements that can be interpreted as expressions of normative expectations (such as "You will walk the dog") can also be interpreted as expressions of predictive expectations (beliefs). After recalling further reasons to think t h a t the resemblance is of a close rather t h a n a distant family sort
Katarzyna Paprzycka received her Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. She is currently a full-time mother teaching part-time at the University of Southern Mississippi. Her articles span the areas of philosophy of action, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and social philosophy. Her main project is a book developing a nonindividualist responsibility-based theory of action centered around the concept of normative expectation rather than intention.
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