Normative Expectations, Intentions, and Beliefs

Abstract

Anscombe noticed t h a t statements naturally interpreted as expressions of intentions (such as "I am going for a w a l k ) could also be interpreted as expressions of beliefs.' Indeed, philosophers of action have been struck by the close conceptual ties between intention and belief. So H. P. Grice observes that it would be awkward to express a n intention of doing something while denying that one believes that one will do it.2 He suggests that a n agent who intends to do something must believe that he will do it. This position has been subject to much scrutiny. In fact, a whole spectrum of views on the relation between intention and belief has been occupied-from the strong position on which the relation between them is that of logical implication, through weaker positions (such as the view that the relation is that of conversational implicature, or that what is implied is only the belief that the agent will try to do what he intends to do), to t h e position t h a t one can intend to do something while believing that it is impossible for one to do it.The aim of this paper is to look at the relation between intention and belief from a different angle. I will examine a different pair of concepts, namely, normative and predictive expectations, which bear a n important resemblance to the pair which gave so much heat to the debate. It is telling, for example, that Anscombe's observation also holds for normative expectations. Statements that can be interpreted as expressions of normative expectations (such as "You will walk the dog") can also be interpreted as expressions of predictive expectations (beliefs). After recalling further reasons to think t h a t the resemblance is of a close rather t h a n a distant family sort Katarzyna Paprzycka received her Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. She is currently a full-time mother teaching part-time at the University of Southern Mississippi. Her articles span the areas of philosophy of action, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and social philosophy. Her main project is a book developing a nonindividualist responsibility-based theory of action centered around the concept of normative expectation rather than intention.

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

“…The distinction between normative and empirical expectations is a long-standing one in the sociology and philosophy literatures (Goffman, 1963;Paprzycka, 1999). By an empirical expectation of conformity to a given norm we mean that one expects the norm to be followed by a majority of people in the appropriate circumstances.…”

Social norms of corruption in the field: social nudges on posters can help to reduce bribery

“…Prominent social norms frameworks distinguish between an injunctive and a descriptive element of social norms (Goffman, 1969; Paprzycka, 1999; Bicchieri, 2016; Cialdini et al , 1990). The injunctive element conveys what is considered as acceptable, while the descriptive element refers to what is considered as common (Tankard & Paluck, 2016).…”

Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy

“…But, as social creatures, we find ourselves in a world of normative expectations that paradigmatically others place on us (cf. Paprzycka 1999). We are thus committed to various things, often without realizing it.…”