Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior.
Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.
Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motivations underlying human decision making. However, because income and wealth inequality exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motivations can point to different decisions. In particular, when a beneficiary is less wealthy than a benefactor, a reciprocal action can lead to greater inequality. In this paper we report data from a trust game variant where trustees' responses to kind intentions generate inequality in favor of investors. In relation to a standard trust game treatment where trustees' responses reduce inequality, the proportion of non-reciprocal decisions is twice as large when reciprocity promotes inequality. Moreover, we find investors expect that this will be the case. Overall, we find a majority (more than half) of trustees do not reciprocate when reciprocity increases inequality that favors investors. Our results call attention to the potential importance of inequality in principal-agent relationships and have important implications for policies aimed at promoting cooperation.JEL classification: C91; C72; D63 Acknowledgment: We wish to thank
Objectives High rates of household participation are critical to the success of door-to-door vector control campaigns. We used the Health Belief Model to assess determinants of participation, including neighbor participation as a cue to action, in a Chagas disease vector control campaign in Peru. Methods We evaluated clustering of participation among neighbors; estimated participation as a function of household infestation status, neighborhood type, and number of participating neighbors; and described reported reasons for refusal to participate in a district of 2911 households. Results We observed significant clustering of participation along city blocks (p< .0001). Participation was significantly higher for households in new vs. established neighborhoods, for infested households, and for households with more participating neighbors. The effect of neighbor participation was greater in new neighborhoods. Conclusions Results support a “contagion” model of participation, highlighting the possibility that one or two participating households can tip a block towards full participation. Future campaigns can leverage these findings by making participation more visible, by addressing stigma associated with spraying, and by employing group incentives to spray.
Several previous studies measure the extent to which individuals trust other individuals and argue that individual trust is an important element of interaction in organizations and markets. However, a related topic is the extent to which it is possible for individuals to trust groups as separate entities. This concept, referred to as collective trust, has been previously discussed but not carefully demonstrated. We conduct experiments that specifically address the question of whether it is possible for individuals to exhibit trust for a group, beyond the trust they exhibit for individual members of that group. Using the trust (or investment) game, our results show that individuals exhibit collective trust: They transfer perceptions of trustworthiness to individuals based on previous experiences with members of that individual's group, even with a very minimal form of group membership.JEL Classification: C92
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