False consciousness of intentional psychology

Paprzycka, Katarzyna

doi:10.1080/0951508021000006094

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…I do not claim to have any conclusive evidence, but there are some reasons for doubt stemming from two sources: folk-psychology and the theory of empathy. From a pre-theoretic perspective at least, it does not seem implausible at all to assume that there need not be some wish to have another person sitting beside oneself, or a desire to conform to other people's wishes, or even just a particular disposition to conform to some set of rules, or any such pro-attitude, to move aside a little on the park bench (Paprzycka 2002). If I move aside, it might seem from a folk-psychological perspective that I do not do so because of anything I want, but I do so because of what she, the other, wants-and similarly for the other examples I have given.…”

Section: §2 Collective Agency and Intentional Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Plural Action

Schmid

2008

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in terms of individual intentional states. I argue that individual intentional autonomy implies neither individual intentional autarky, nor intentional individualism, with which it is usually lumped together. I further argue that this insight is the key to an adequate view of an important class of actions, i.e., plural actions.

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Section: §2 Collective Agency and Intentional Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Plural Action

Schmid

2008

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

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“…Sneddon (2002) has argued that there is some reason to think that psychopathology will support externalism about some cognitive processes. On a slightly different note, Paprzycka (2002) argues for changes to psychological theories to include ordinary and widespread externalist rationalizing explanations of everyday action. 4 Maybe tying one's laces is an externalistic competence even for us.…”

Section: How To Proceed?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference it Should Make

Sneddon

2005

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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P.F. Strawson's work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark "Freedom and Resentment" has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson's position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.What I call the individualist assumption in the philosophy of psychology is the assumption that whatever we find it significant to name -whatever patterns of feeling and behavior we find salient enough to use in explanations of ourselves and othersmust also pick out complex events, states, or processes with respect to some theory of the functioning of individual organisms (for example, neurophysiology) (Scheman, 1996).

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“…This is a rather wide-spread phenomenon that linguists call "neg-raising." It has received relatively little attention from philosophers, though it is the basis of interesting fallacies (Paprzycka 2002;2014a;Wasserman 2011). she drops on the bed unable to move and falls asleep. She did a lot of things that day.…”

Section: 3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy

Kuźniar¹,

Odrowąż‐Sypniewska²

2016

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False consciousness of intentional psychology

Cited by 10 publications

References 12 publications

Plural Action

Plural Action

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference it Should Make

Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy

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