Plural Action

Abstract

In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in terms of individual intentional states. I argue that individual intentional autonomy implies neither individual intentional autarky, nor intentional individualism, with which it is usually lumped together. I further argue that this insight is the key to an adequate view of an important class of actions, i.e., plural actions.

Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther

“…In recent years, however, there has been an increasing focus on the capacity that minded beings have for sharing other types of mental states, such as emotions (cf. von Scheve and Salmela 2014;Schmid 2009) and perceptual experiences (cf. Seemann 2012).…”

Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy

“…The attempt to understand the weaker standard of intentionality in terms of the stronger standard of intentionality is his cardinal mistake. It is worth pointing out that the move here is that of individualist intentionalism (see Paprzycka 1997;Schmid 2008;. We have a tendency to privilege the individual agent in all our thinking about agency.…”

Shared emotions: a Steinian proposal

“…shared in a sense that means more than the sharedness of the underlying appraisal pattern, we need to account for the sharing of affective experience. Schmid was the first to address this question head on, exploring whether there is a straightforward sense in which a feeling can be shared (Schmid 2008(Schmid , 2009.…”

“…It is not that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know they are feeling it. No, it is a feeling-together.^ (Scheler 2008, 12 f.; translation modified) Taking up another suggestion made by Scheler, Schmid distinguishes two kinds of subject of a conscious state: BThe subject of a conscious state can mean either of the following: a) the subject who has the conscious state in question; b) the subject as who the subject takes himself or herself to have the state in question.^ (Schmid 2009, 77) Schmid's idea is to allow different subjects to take positions a) and b). He claims that this will enable us to develop a straightforward sense of sharing without violating the true intuition expressed in individualism about feelings: BIndividuals can have only their own conscious states, especially feelingsbut this does not answer the question as who those individuals take themselves to have their conscious states … Without doubt, the parents in Scheler's example are two different persons each of whom has his or her own feelings.…”