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Questions concerning both the ontology and epistemology of the “psychiatric object” (symptoms and signs) should be at the forefront of current concerns of psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience. We argue that neglect of these issues is a crucial source of the stagnation of psychiatric research. In honor of the centenary of Karl Jaspers’ book, General Psychopathology, we offer a critique of the contemporary “operationalist” epistemology, a critique that is consistent with Jaspers’ views. Symptoms and signs cannot be properly understood or identified apart from an appreciation of the nature of consciousness or subjectivity, which in turn cannot be treated as a collection of thing-like, mutually independent objects, accessible to context-free, “atheoretical” definitions or unproblematic forms of measurement (as is often assumed in structured interviewing). Adequate and faithful distinctions in the phenomenal or experiential realm are therefore a fundamental prerequisite for classification, treatment, and research. This requires a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating (among other things) insights provided by psychology, phenomenological philosophy, and the philosophy of mind.

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we haveaccording to the standard viewa choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by a various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathyan account that has recently undergone something of a revival in the hands of contemporary simulationistswith various accounts of empathy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutza thinker whose contribution to an analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent year. In recent years, much of the discussion of the nature of social cognition has taken place within the framework of the so-called theory-of-mind debate. The expression 'theory of mind' is generally used as shorthand for our ability to attribute mental states to self and others and to interpret, predict, and explain behaviour in terms of mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and desires (cf. Premack & Woodruff 1978, 515). Although it was originally assumed that it was the possession and use of a theory that provided the individual with the capacity to attribute mental states, the contemporary debate is split on the issue, and is generally considered to be a dispute between two views. On one side, we find the theory-theory of mind and