The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge

Abstract

The characteristic asymmetry in intentionality attributions that is known as the Knobe effect can be explained by conjoining an orthodox theory of intentional action with a normative account of intentional omission. On the latter view: (a) omissions presuppose some normative context; (b) there are good reasons why the intentionality of omissions requires agents' knowledge rather than intention. The asymmetry in intentionality attributions in Knobe's cases can be seen to be derivative from an asymmetry in intentional omissions. The omissions account further explains the Butler problem and some related puzzles. It also safeguards the simple view of intentional action from the asymmetry challenge.

Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy

“…3 I will not be concerned with the explanatory scope of either Holton's or the omissions account. I believe that both accounts can handle pretty much the same data (Holton 2010;Paprzycka 2015). Holton shows that his account applies equally well to the cases of morally good norm violations, so does the omissions account.…”

“…If it is the case that intentional action requires that the intention cause the action in the right way, then once again we have a reason to deny (Γ1). The principle only looks good but it is a principle we should be very suspicious of (see also Paprzycka 2015).…”

“…I have argued elsewhere (Paprzycka 2014b(Paprzycka , 2015 that it is fruitful to think that the fundamental distinction that underlies the asymmetric intentionality attributions is the distinction between intentional omissions and intentional actions. In this paper, I will show that there are some tensions and problems in Holton's account that can be eased by rethinking the distinction that is at stake.…”

Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect

“…See also Peels (2010Peels ( , 2014; Rosen (2008). 6 It has been argued that the knowledge condition rather than the intention condition is required for the intentionality of omissions on the normative account thereof (see Paprzycka 2015Paprzycka , 2016a; for contrary arguments on other accounts of omissions, see e.g. Clarke 2010Clarke , 2012aClarke , b, 2014Zimmerman 1981).…”

The Knobe Effect From the Perspective of Normative Orders

“…A great deal of attention has been paid to the relationship between the attribution of intentionality and the attribution of guilt [13], [17], [15], [16], [18], [7], [6]. Some substantiations take into account the essential role of moral factors focused on norms and explained the attribution of intentionality with their violation [8] or intentional omission [20], [21]. Authors focusing on the role of moral arguments in explaining the observed phenomena paid less attention to subtleties related to categorisations or practical application of the concept of intentional action [2], [1], as they proved to be insufficient to explain the observed asymmetries [9], [19].…”