This paper provides empirical evidence that declaring independence significantly lowers per capita GDP based on a large panel of countries covering the period 1950-2013. To do so, we rely on a semi-parametric identification strategy that controls for the confounding effects of past GDP dynamics, anticipation effects, unobserved heterogeneity, model uncertainty and effect heterogeneity.Our baseline results indicate that declaring independence reduces per capita GDP by around 20% in the long run. We subsequently propose a novel triple-difference procedure to demonstrate the stability of these results. Another methodological novelty consists of the development of a two-step estimator to shed some light on the primary channels driving our results. We find robust evidence that the adverse effects of independence increase in the extent of surface area loss, pointing to the presence of economies of scale, but that they are mitigated when newly independent states liberalize their trade regime or use their new-found political autonomy to democratize.

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This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets. On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.

This paper estimates the causal effects of Flanders' main industrial policy programme, aiming to support economic development in lagging municipalities. The identification strategy exploits a State Aid reform which required Member States to propose a designation methodology and a selection of eligible municipalities in accordance with the new guidelines. While the proposed designation indicators allow us to account for selection on observables, further compliance with State Aid guidelines make causal inference possible. Additionally, we exploit exogenous intervention in the selection of municipalities, as the first regional aid map was not accepted by the European Commission. We find strong evidence for a 10% effect on manufacturing employment, largely explained by jobs safeguarded in declining industries.

We consistently estimate the parameters of 600 and 1200 ft lock congestion functions by exploiting the geographical variation in demand patterns for individual locks along the Upper Mississippi River system of locks and dams. In addition to avoiding endogeneity bias, we control for lock-specific heterogeneity in estimating a fixedeffects regression model that relates lock congestion to lock usage and lock characteristics. Using a panel data set spanning the years 1993-2010, we find significant empirical evidence of the existence of a quadratic lock congestion function for 600 ft technology in the sense of BPR (1964). While 1200 ft technology on the other hand seemly operates under free-flow conditions, the presence of an auxiliary chamber significantly mitigates congestion, with the effect being more pronounced for higher levels of traffic. Unscheduled lock outages and non-commercial traffic attenuate lock congestion.

This paper provides empirical evidence that declaring independence significantly lowers per capita GDP based on a large panel of countries covering the period 1950-2013. To do so, we rely on a semi-parametric identification strategy that controls for the confounding effects of past GDP dynamics, anticipation effects, unobserved heterogeneity, model uncertainty and effect heterogeneity.Our baseline results indicate that declaring independence reduces per capita GDP by around 20% in the long run. We subsequently propose a novel triple-difference procedure to demonstrate the stability of these results. Another methodological novelty consists of the development of a two-step estimator to shed some light on the primary channels driving our results. We find robust evidence that the adverse effects of independence increase in the extent of surface area loss, pointing to the presence of economies of scale, but that they are mitigated when newly independent states liberalize their trade regime or use their new-found political autonomy to democratize.

This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets. On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.