Complementary Platforms

Cayseele, Patrick J. G. Van; Reynaerts, Jo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1021705

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 31 publications

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“…Theoretical modelling predicts a redistribution of surplus across sides of a platform in favour of the one with a higher elasticity of demand, that is, from single‐ to a multi‐homing side (Armstrong and Wright, 2007). It may also appear in case of mergers (Van Cayseele and Reynaerts, 2011). However, this effect, even though capable of being measured, is helpless for identifying an exclusionary practice, as the result is the same as that of short‐run profit maximization.…”

Section: Balancing the Pro‐ And Anti‐competitive Effects Of Business mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Unified Presentation of Competition Analysis in Two‐sided Markets

Ribeiro

Golovanova

2020

Journal of Economic Surveys

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The goal of this paper is to present quantitative tools to manage competition policy analysis in two‐sided platforms, based on a common framework for transaction and non‐transaction platforms. We explore tools for relevant market definition [Critical Loss Analysis and a small but significant non‐transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test], unilateral effects indicators [Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI)] and tests for exclusionary practices. We review dispersed results in the literature and fill the gaps where appropriate. We highlight the required changes from the usual one‐sided market framework and tools. While discussions of antitrust tools can be found in specialized forums devoted to advances in competition policy analysis, we organize the material in an integrated framework.

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Section: Balancing the Pro‐ And Anti‐competitive Effects Of Business mentioning

confidence: 99%