Simulating mergers between stevedores

Reynaerts, Jo

doi:10.1057/mel.2009.17

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In particular, a dashed line was used to describe the process conducted by ports [4]. Reynaerts models container-handling competition in ports as Bertrand competition, arguing that competition in the terminal-handling business is based on prices and not quantities [5]. Van Reeven uses a symmetrical, spatial differentiation model with Cournot outcomes in order to analyse interand intra-port competition under two different governance schemes: landlord and service ports.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition or Cooperation: a Simulation of the Price Strategy of Ports

周鑫¹

2015

Int. j. simul. model.

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Ports act as the nodes connecting water transport with land transport and play pivotal roles in logistics networks. The rapid rise in international freight volume has led to a faster growth in the throughputs of many ports. With the development of containerization, services provided by different ports could be substitutable with each other, especially those in the same region which are more competitive for substitutability. However, the question must be asked: is competition unchangeable? Moreover, is competition strategy always the best solution for ports? The purpose of this article is to analyse the issue of which strategy is better for ports: competition or cooperation. Using a modified Hotelling model, multiple competitors are analysed applying a competition strategy and simulations are developed of three ports with competitive and cooperative targets respectively. Research results reveal that, with the same service levels, location is a critical factor for competitive ports and, with a view to capturing greater market share, ports are motivated to form alliances.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition or Cooperation: a Simulation of the Price Strategy of Ports

周鑫¹

2015

Int. j. simul. model.

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“…In recent years, industrial organization and game theory models had also been used to examine port competition and capacity investments (e.g. De Borger, Proost, & Van Dender, 2008;De Borger & Van Dender, 2006;Kaselimi, Notteboom, & De Borger, 2011;Luo, Liu, & Gao, 2012;Reynaerts, 2010). Such models require various assumptions and simplifications, making it difficult to directly apply market data.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of the Dynamics of Ownership, Capacity Investments and Pricing Structure of Ports

Xiao

Yang

et al. 2012

Transport Reviews

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With more than 80% of the world's cargoes being transported by sea, effective port management is critical to the well-being of the global economy. This study models the effects of port ownership and governance on capacity investment and pricing structure, and these changes' implications on port service level and social welfare. The study argues that capacity investment and pricing are significantly influenced by a port's ownership form, and the different levels of government involved. Inter-port competition leads to increased capacity investments by private investors and local authorities, which can be either higher or lower than social optimal level. Therefore, it is important for policymakers to consider the effects of institutional and competition factors in port reform initiatives.

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“…Reynaerts [30] empirically examines the merger between Hessenatie and Noordnatie in Belgium in 2001 and its effect on consumer prices and welfare. The author models container-handling competition in ports as Bertrand competition arguing that competition in the terminal-handling business is based on prices and not quantities.…”

Section: Competition In the Port And Terminal-handling Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The statements of Reynaerts [30] on the perceived heterogeneity of container terminal services thus only hold when dealing with largely diverging/ complementary characteristics in terms of factors such as nautical accessibility, foreland, and hinterland orientation [37]. If ports are considered as substitutes then the same should count for their terminal services implying service homogeneity.…”

Section: Competition In the Port And Terminal-handling Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

A game theoretical approach to competition between multi-user terminals: the impact of dedicated terminals

Kaselimi

Notteboom

Borger³

2011

Maritime Policy & Management

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In response to globalization and structural changes in logistics, firms in the transport industry have re-evaluated the scope of their activities [1]. A large number of shipping lines are vertically integrated to include terminal operations through shareholdings in or full ownership of dedicated terminal facilities. A number of terminal operating companies expanded their activities from their respective homeports to an international terminal network structure. These two developments have led to a competitive setting in which trans-national terminal operating companies and shipping lines vie for the control over terminal capacity. In this paper, a horizontal product differentiation model is introduced to analyze competition between container terminals using a game theoretic approach. We focus on a landlord port management system with long-term concessions agreements shaping the formal relationships between the Port Authority (PA) (who owns the land) and the private Terminal Operators (TOs) (who use the land for terminal activities). Starting from the linear city model of Hotelling [2], we develop a framework for Cournot competition between multi-user terminals. By comparing the results (expected payoffs for potential TOs and PAs) of different cases, this paper demonstrates how the shift toward a fully dedicated terminal impacts on intra-port and inter-port competition between the remaining multiuser terminals. The model is illustrated by referring to a case of terminal competition in a realistic setting.

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Simulating mergers between stevedores

Cited by 10 publications

References 16 publications

Competition or Cooperation: a Simulation of the Price Strategy of Ports

Competition or Cooperation: a Simulation of the Price Strategy of Ports

An Analysis of the Dynamics of Ownership, Capacity Investments and Pricing Structure of Ports

A game theoretical approach to competition between multi-user terminals: the impact of dedicated terminals

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