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This paper serves two purposes. First, we argue that radial efficiency measures are inappropriate for the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) technology, and we provide a comparative analysis of alternative nonradial measures. In particular, using information on Belgian local government expenditures and output indicators we implement various radial and nonradial measures on the FDH reference technology, and we investigate to which extent these efficiency measures imply different distributions and rankings. Second, we analyze the patterns of measured technical efficiency implied by the various indices. Specifically, we investigate whether different measures make any substantial difference for the explanation of the calculated inefficiencies. The empirical results suggest that more important differences in rankings exist between radial and nonradial measures than between different nonradial alternatives; moreover, the radial and the nonradial efficiency measures do yield a somewhat different pattern of explanation.

Be r ke l e y (W CTR 2007) a nd Le uve n. Opi ni ons s t a t e d i n t hi s pa pe r a r e pe r s ona l a nd not t hos e of t he or ga ni z a t i ons me nt i one d i n t he t hi r d a ut hor ' s a f f i l i a t i on. 1 To focus on a few well defined aspects of the interaction port-hinterland, we ignore many real-world complications, like the behavior of private operators within ports, the structure of the shipping industry, supply chain considerations, etc. Introducing them into the current model would not affect the main lessons derived from the paper but would strongly complicate the technical analysis. 2 Similar examples of competing ports with congested hinterlands include ports on the West Coast of the U.S., Mexican and U.S. ports in the Gulf of Mexico, etc. The interaction between the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in California is a variation on the theme developed here, in the sense that these ports share the same congestible hinterland.

In response to globalization and structural changes in logistics, firms in the transport industry have re-evaluated the scope of their activities [1]. A large number of shipping lines are vertically integrated to include terminal operations through shareholdings in or full ownership of dedicated terminal facilities. A number of terminal operating companies expanded their activities from their respective homeports to an international terminal network structure. These two developments have led to a competitive setting in which trans-national terminal operating companies and shipping lines vie for the control over terminal capacity. In this paper, a horizontal product differentiation model is introduced to analyze competition between container terminals using a game theoretic approach. We focus on a landlord port management system with long-term concessions agreements shaping the formal relationships between the Port Authority (PA) (who owns the land) and the private Terminal Operators (TOs) (who use the land for terminal activities). Starting from the linear city model of Hotelling [2], we develop a framework for Cournot competition between multi-user terminals. By comparing the results (expected payoffs for potential TOs and PAs) of different cases, this paper demonstrates how the shift toward a fully dedicated terminal impacts on intra-port and inter-port competition between the remaining multiuser terminals. The model is illustrated by referring to a case of terminal competition in a realistic setting.

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