2011
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1213
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Complementary Platforms

Abstract: This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets. On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The two Belgian financial newspapers De Tijd (in Dutch) and L'Echo (in French) represent complementary platforms. In fact, both papers connect Dutch-and French-speaking readers with companies that want to convey information (Van Cayseele and Reynaerts, 2011). So, to reach both Dutch-and French-speaking investors, companies need to buy advertisement space in both newspapers, which represent complementary inputs for the provision of corporate information.…”
Section: An Economic Viewpoint: Artificial Intelligence Platforms And...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The two Belgian financial newspapers De Tijd (in Dutch) and L'Echo (in French) represent complementary platforms. In fact, both papers connect Dutch-and French-speaking readers with companies that want to convey information (Van Cayseele and Reynaerts, 2011). So, to reach both Dutch-and French-speaking investors, companies need to buy advertisement space in both newspapers, which represent complementary inputs for the provision of corporate information.…”
Section: An Economic Viewpoint: Artificial Intelligence Platforms And...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Changes in the level of inter-network compatibility positively affect the weak platform's marginal incentives to invest and negatively affect those of the dominant one. 28 In sum, two salient aspects of the compatibility-welfare puzzle follow. First, substitutes goods are "bad" for compatibility.…”
Section: Final Remarksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Our analysis of complementary platforms is also a contribution to this literature. Van Cayseele and Reynaerts (2011) study the effects of joint ownership in a model where platforms are complementary on the multihoming side but compete on the single-homing side. We analyze a more general model with any number of (strictly) complementary platforms and inter-group network externalities among n ≥ 2 sides and identify a novel Cournot complementary effect in terms of how the number of platforms distorts the centrality measure of each side.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%