Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it's standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations.

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Drawing on uncertainty‐identity theory (Hogg, 2012), we explore the effects of uncertainty concerning a specific social identity on group identification and attitudes toward subgroup integration and separation in South Koreans' nested identity context (N = 148). All variables were measured. Path analysis revealed, as predicted, that superordinate identity uncertainty weakened superordinate identification and subgroup identity uncertainty weakened subgroup identification. We also found that subgroup identity uncertainty strengthened superordinate identification. This effect was stronger for those who perceived their superordinate group prototype and subgroup prototype to be distinct and nonoverlapping. Furthermore, superordinate identity uncertainty decreased reunification intentions by weakening superordinate identification. Subgroup identity uncertainty increased reunification intentions by strengthening superordinate identification only for those who perceived their superordinate group prototype and subgroup prototype to be distinct and nonoverlapping. Implications for uncertainty identity theory and intergroup relations are discussed.

Using the Global Trust Inventory, an integrated measure of trust toward 21 relationships and institutions, the structure of trust was explored in four East Asian societies (Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). The Western model, in which trust is distributed among seven factors representing different branches of society, did not generalize to these East Asian societies, perhaps due to differences in culture and institutional power structures. Instead, two unique structures of trust were identified. Mainland China had a top-down structure of trust (the China model), in which trust is hierarchically separated between the central government and subordinate implementing bodies. The other three democratic East Asian societies shared a hybrid structure of trust (the Democratic East Asian model) that has a degree of similarity to both the China model and the Western model. Having established two similar, but still distinct models, a crosscultural comparison was made on the proportions of trust profiles generated by latent profile analysis. Mainland China had the largest proportion of people with a high propensity to trust, followed by Japan and South Korea, and Taiwan was the least trusting. Implications of the structure of trust and this alternative approach to conducting cross-cultural comparisons are discussed.

This article aims to describe the last 10 years of the collaborative scientific endeavors on polarization in particular and collective problem-solving in general by our multidisciplinary research team. We describe the team's disciplinary composition-social psychology, political science, social philosophy/epistemology, and complex systems science-highlighting the shared and unique skill sets of our group members and how each discipline contributes to studying polarization and collective problem-solving. With an eye to the literature on team dynamics, we describe team logistics and processes that we believe make our multidisciplinary team persistent and productive. We emphasize challenges and difficulties caused by disciplinary differences in terms of terminology, units/levels of analysis, methodology, and theoretical assumptions. We then explain how work disambiguating the concepts of polarization and developing an integrative theoretical and methodological framework with complex systems perspectives has helped us overcome these challenges. We summarize the major findings that our research has produced over the past decade, and describe our current research and future directions. Last, we discuss lessons we have learned, including difficulties in a "three models" project and how we addressed them, with suggestions for effective multidisciplinary team research.

Drawing on uncertainty-identity theory, we investigated how people respond differently to identity uncertainty at a superordinate (i.e., UK) or subgroup (i.e., Scottish) level depending on the subjective self-conceptual centrality of subgroup relative to superordinate group; altering superordinate and subgroup identification and attitude toward subgroup relations to the superordinate group in the context of Scotland's bid for independence from the UK (N = 115). Hierarchical regression analyses confirmed our prediction. Where the subgroup was self-conceptually more central than the superordinate group, subgroup identity uncertainty strengthened superordinate identification (H1) and weakened subgroup identification. Strengthened superordinate identification weakened support for subgroup separation. However, where the superordinate group was self-conceptually more central than the subgroup, superordinate identity uncertainty was not associated with superordinate and subgroup identification (H2).

Abstract:We are increasingly exposed to polarized media sources, with clear evidence that individuals choose those sources closest to their existing views. We also have a tradition of open face-to-face group discussion in town meetings, for example. There are a range of current proposals to revive the role of group meetings in democratic decision-making. Here, we build a simulation that instantiates aspects of reinforcement theory in a model of competing social influences. What can we expect in the interaction of polarized media with group interaction along the lines of town meetings? Some surprises are evident from a computational model that includes both. Deliberative group discussion can be expected to produce opinion convergence. That convergence may not, however, be a cure for extreme views polarized at opposite ends of the opinion spectrum. In a large class of cases, we show that adding the influence of group meetings in an environment of self-selected media produces not a moderate central consensus but opinion convergence at one of the extremes defined by polarized media.

The present research investigates how psychological mechanisms and social network structures generate patterns of cultural change and diversity. The two psychological mechanisms studied here are cultural drift and indirect minority influence; the former is parameterized by an error rate e) and the latter by a leniency threshold (k). The patterns of cultural change are examined in terms of magnitude (small vs. large), speed (gradual vs. rapid), and frequency (frequent vs. rare). Diversity and polarization in a society are examined in terms of global cultural variation (inverse Simpson index) and local neighborhood difference (Hamming distance). Key findings are that in networks with high connectivity or local community structures (complete, scale-free, random, and modular networks) cultural drift can produce a rapid, large, and rare pattern of cultural change (punctuated equilibrium), whereas in lattice or small world networks, it produces a more gradual change pattern. Indirect minority influence robustly produces a gradual, small, and frequent pattern of cultural change (gradualism) across various network structures. When cultural change occurs in social networks that have a modular community structure, indirect minority influence generates a regime of cultural diversity whereas cultural drift generates a polarized regime. Finally, cultural drift and indirect minority influence generate distinct tipping points for social change in different network structures, but prediction of whether and when cultural change emerges is difficult at tipping points in both cases.