Rational social and political polarization

Abstract

Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it's standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations.

Information elaboration and epistemic effects of diversity

“…While we agree that it can be useful to drill down on a single aspect of a phenomenon in idealized isolation (cf. Singer et al 2018, p. 5), we do not agree that this is the only way models can promote understanding.…”

“…Tollefsen 2006 , p. 39). In-group epistemic conformity can also result from mechanisms similar to those proposed to explain group polarization, wherein an initial tilt in group option becomes more skewed and extreme due to deliberation (Singer 2018 ; Sunstein 2002 ). Individuals may accept claims made by groupmates and discount their own conflicting information, and they may attempt to maintain a positive reputation by preferentially communicating information that reiforces claims of others (Sunstein 2002 , pp.…”

What are the chances you’re right about everything? An epistemic challenge for modern partisanship

“…Similarly, believing that abortion is seriously immoral after 20 weeks of pregnancy is less extreme than believing that abortion is seriously immoral at any point in the pregnancy. 30 See, for example, Singer et al (2018). 31 For a thorough recent discussion of confirmation bias, see Mercier and Sperber (2019).…”

Endogenous Epistemic Factionalization: A Network Epistemology Approach

“…13 These models differ in that Olsson (2013) focuses on individuals who share statements of belief, while O'Connor and , in an attempt to more closely model scientific communities, consider a model where agents share evidence. In addition, Singer et al (2018) consider a polarization model where agents share 'reasons' for a belief, in the form of positive and negative weights, which might be interpreted as evidence from the world. adoption in multiple attributes leads to correlation among those attributes.…”